¶2I dissent from the opinion of the majority because I believe that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree burglary.
¶3The elements of second degree burglary which the State was required to prove are that the appellant (1) broke, (2) and entered (3) into a building or structure not a place of human habitation (4) with intent to commit a theft therein.
¶4The sole evidence tending to prove that the appellant broke and entered the O. K. Tire Store with intent to commit a theft was his possession of tires taken from that store. Appellant was seen to have been loading the tires from a cornfield into a panel truck some six to seven hours after the burglary allegedly took place. Shortly thereafter appellant was apprehended in the panel truck. Appellant admitted loading the tires from the cornfield into the truck and there can be no doubt that the stolen tires were found in possession of the appellant. The State presented no evidence other than the appellant’s possession of the stolen tires from which inference can be drawn that the appellant was the one who broke and entered the tire store.
¶5The question here then is whether the nexus between the appellant and the burglary can be established merely by possession of the stolen goods. I do not believe it can.
¶6I recently dissented to two cases of a similar nature, Bolton v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 648, 261 N. E. 2d 841, and Vaughn v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 678, 266 N. E. 2d 219. Those dissents apply with equal vigor here.
¶7This Court in Boltonsaid:
“We hold that the State had made its prima facie case before the trial court when it presented evidence of the exclusive possession in the appellants shortly after the theft of the tractor.” 261 N. E. 2d at 843.
¶8In both Boltonand Vaughnthe appellants were charged with the crime of theft. This Court in affirming both convictions *438re-asserted the rule that an inference of guilt of theft may be drawn from exclusive, unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. In those cases I believe the Court erroneously allowed the proof of possession, being the sole nexus between the appellants and the theft, to support the convictions. In the case at bar, the majority creates a new and unwarranted precedent by extending the rule of Boltonand Vaughnto include second degree burglary. That is to say that mere possession is prima facie proof of breaking and entering with intent to steal. My research reveals that no burglary conviction has been sustained on review by the application of the “recent, exclusive unexplained possession rule” alone. In each and every case where this Court sustained a conviction for burglary and in so doing applied the “recent, exclusive unexplained possession rule” there is additional evidence connecting the appellant to the burglary; evidence which places the appellant at the site of the crime. In the case at bar no such evidence exists and all inferences must be drawn from possession alone. The State in its brief urges the following:
“From the evidence previously set forth most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant and the two other men stole the red flat bed truck from the Soil Service and used it to put the tires on during the burglary. That they drove the truck to a cornfield where they dumped the tires. That they then ditched the truck and loaded the tires into the panel truck for transportation elsewhere. That the repeated trips back and forth were necessary, since not all of the tires would fit into the panel truck.”
¶9I believe such inferences are unwarranted from evidence of possession alone. There was evidence introduced that a flat bed truck was stolen from the Eberhard Soil Service nearby the tire store. Somewhat tenacious evidence was introduced to show that the truck was used in the burglary. However, no shred of evidence links the appellant to the theft or use of the soil service truck. At the time of his arrest, ap*439pellant was a passenger in an entirely different truck. Likewise the record is completely devoid of evidence which would in anyway place the appellant at the scene of the crime.
¶10My attention is drawn to the case of Finch v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 122, 231 N. E. 2d 45. In that case a meat market had been burglarized by means of entering into a second story window and breaking through a plaster ceiling. The appellant was found some nine and one-half hours after the burglary approximately one and one-half miles away. Meat and cigarettes in the possession of the appellant matched the description of those taken in the burglary. Plasterlike substance was found in the hair of the appellant. This Court reversed the appellant’s conviction for burglary holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove all the elements of the crime, to-wit: the breaking and entering.
¶11In the case at bar there is even less evidence than in the Finchcase tending to connect appellant with the burglary. Here there is no evidence comparable to the “plasterlike substance” which might tend to show that the appellant was at the scene of the burglary.
¶12The admissions of the appellant at trial and the other evidence that appellant loaded the tires from a cornfield onto a panel truck some seven hours after they were stolen in the burglary is evidence which is relevant to the issue of the appellant’s guilt, and is circumstances from which the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences. Evidence of recent exclusive possession might establish a prima facie case under I.C. 1971, 35-17-5-3, being Burns § 10-3030 (d), (receiving stolen property). However, I believe it erroneous to allow such evidence to establish a prima facie case or a presumption of guilt of second degree burglary.
¶13Note. — Reported in 269 N. E. 381.