Volume 256 — United States Reports

Held: that the courts below rightly permitted the United States to set up a statutory repeal at the second trial which was ignored at the first. P. 10. 261 Fed. Rep. 833 , affirmed.

<p>Decided on the authority of Chase, Jr. v. United States, ante, 1. 261 Fed. Rep. 841, affirmed.</p>

Held: that clauses in the contract making decisions of the officer as to quantity and quality of work final, requiring the contractors to observe his instructions and denying any claim for modification, of the work not agreed to, .or expressly required, in writing, — were inapplicable, and that the contractors were entitled to recover from the United States the cost of excavating the material not covered by the contract.

Petition by the .respondent for. a rehearing as to questions presented but left undecided in s. c., 255 U. S. 151. The questions are disposed of on the argument as originally made. in support of the petition.

<p>Decree reciting report of the commissioners heretofore appointed to run, locate and mark the boundary between Arkansas and Mississippi involved in this case; overruling the exceptions thereto filed by Mississippi; confirming the' report; establishing the boundary as set forth by the said report and upon the map accompanying the same; and allowing the expenses and compensation of the said commissioners as part of the costs of this suit to be borne equally by the parties, etc.</p>

<p>1. A decision made by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia upon an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents under § 9 of the Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, is hot reviewable in this court by appeal or certiorari under §§ 250,251, of the Judicial Code, since such decisions are merely certified to the Commissioner to govern his further proceedings in the case, as in patent matters (Rev. Stats., § 4914), and are not, therefore, final judgments. P. 38.</p> <p>2. Assumption of jurisdiction by this court in a case where no question of jurisdiction was raised or considered, does not establish its jurisdiction over that class of cases. P. 40.</p> <p>Appeal to review 48 App. D. C. 437, dismissed; petition for a writ of certiorari denied.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>on behalf of respondent, submitted the case without briefir argument.</p>

Held: that his claim was an adverse claim which the District Court was without jurisdiction to dispose of summarily in the bankruptcy proceedings over his objection. P. 48. Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18 . 261 Fed. Rep. 670 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Fred B. Dodge, with whom Mr. Kay Todd, Mr. Walter Fosnes and Mr. Charles W. Sterling were on the brief, for petitioner.

The case is stated in the opinion, post, 98. The statutes of Delaware and the. proceedings taken thereunder in this case are unconstitutional and void, in that plaintiff in error was thereby deprived of his property without due process of law. The essential elements of due process, namely, the right to appear and to be heard in defense of the action in which plaintiff in error’s property was attached, are lacking here.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A federal question which could have been raised before but was first raised in the state Supreme Court by a petition for rehearing, which that court merely overruled, does not confer jurisdiction on this court. •</p> <p>Writ of error to review 290 Illinois, 227, dismissed.</p>

Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that states may not retroactively render valid contracts invalid via statute.

<p>That particular lands included in a drainage district will receive no direct benefits is clearly not per se enough to. exempt them, under the Fourteenth Amendment, from assessment. P. 130. Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 182 California, 252, dismissed; petition for a writ of eertiorari denied.</p>

<p>PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), is a United States Supreme Court case which upheld a temporary rent control law in the District of Columbia. It set a precedent in American law that government can regulate housing conditions during times of emergency to maintain or improve living conditions. Three years later, the rental property statute upheld in the case reached the Court for a second review. In Chastleton Corp v. Sinclair, despite the language being the same, the statute was unanimously struck down in a decision where the Court held that the emergency necessitating the measure had passed, and that which "justified interference with ordinarily existing property rights as of 1919 had come to an end by 1922."

Held: that such regulation, as applied in favor of tenants holding over under an expired lease in disregard of their covenant to surrender, did *171 not deprive the landlord of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Contract Clause of the Constitution, although the lease was executed before and expired soon after the date of the legislation and the landlord before the enactment had entered into a new lease with a…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE , EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

. Error to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing a judgment obtained by the present plaintiff in error in an action for triple damages under the Sherman Act in the District Court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Order restoring the case to the docket, directing the taking of supplemental proofs and suggesting the consolidation of this cause with another between the States of South Dakota and Minnesota.</p>

<p>1. Remainder interests which vested after a state transfer tax law was approved but before the time when, as construed by the state Supreme Court, it became effective, but which nevertheless were subjected to it by that court upon the theory that the vesting actually occurred after it became effective, are not to be regarded as taxed thereby in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, (even assuming that such a tax may hot be laid retroactively), since the law might have been made applicable before the interests vested. P. 224. .</p> <p>2. A decision of a state court made upon grounds having no relation to any federal question and without purpose to evade a federal issue, will be accepted by this court, whether right or wrong, when the case comes here for review. P. 225.</p> <p>43 Nevada, 12, affirmed; petition for writ of certiorari dénied.</p>

Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that the United States Constitution did not grant the United States Congress the authority to regulate political party primaries or nomination processes. The court struck down 1911 amendments to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act which placed spending limits on candidate and political election committee spending in primaries or other nomination processes for federal office.

Held: That the right of New York to maintain such a suit on' behalf of her citizens was clear, without regard to the precise lo *297 cation of the boundary between the two States or to New York’s claim of jurisdiction over the waters of New York Bay. P. 301.

Held: that the tax could not be regarded as a direct burden upon the company’s franchise to conduct its interstate traffic over the bridge, upon the ground that the “other property ” valued consisted solely of that franchise, since it appeared that much of the value of the railway as a going con* *315 cern was due to exclusive rights on the bridge and lucrative traffic arrangements resulting from private contracts with.…

<p>1. The transmission of restricted Indian allotments by will is governed by the Act of June 25, 1910, c. 431, § 2, 36 Stat. 856, amended February 14, 1913, c. 55, 37 Stat. 678, and the regulations thereunder prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. P. 323.</p> <p>2. Oklahoma Code, § 8341, providing that no woman while married shall devise (“bequeath ”) more than two-thirds of her property away from her husband, does not affect a will made by a Quapaw woman and approved by the Secretary after her death, so devising her restricted land. P. 322.</p> <p>261 Fed. Rep. 309, affirmed.</p>

<p>A watchman employed on an interstate railroad at a public grade crossing to signal both interstate and intrastate trains and guard the tracks against disorder and obstruction, is employed in interstate commerce, irrespective of the interstate or intrastate character of the particular train he may be flagging when injured. P. 329. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146.</p> <p>266 Pa. St. 412, reversed.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI to the supreme court of the state of PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that if a person is attacked, and that person reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily injury, he has no duty to retreat and may stand his ground and, if he kills his attacker, he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense.

Held: an indirect tax, not requiring appor-;', tionment, and not an unconstitutionaHnterference with the-rights-/ of the States to regulate descent and distribution. P. 348. Knowb"' ton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 . 2. That the tax may occasión inequalities in amounts received by beneficiaries does not affect its validity.

Held: that the bill stated a cause for an injunction. P. 357. 269 Fed. Rep. 4 , reversed. Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decree of the District Court,/dismissing, for want of equity, a bill brought by divers state banks against a Federal Reserve Bank and its officers for an injunction. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE . COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Certiorari to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the District Court on a conviction under an indictment. The facts aré stated in the opinion.</p>

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Congress, when proposing a constitutional amendment under the authority given to it by Article V of the Constitution, may fix a definite period for its ratification, and further, that a seven-year period, such as that fixed by Congress in the resolution proposing the Eighteenth Amendment, is reasonable. Additionally, the Court, upon taking judicial notice that the Eighteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution on January 16, 1919, when its ratification in the state legislatures was consummated, held that the National Prohibition Act, known informally as the Volstead Act, entered into force on January 16, 1920.

<p>certiorari to the superior court of the state of ' PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Yee Won v. White, 256 U.S. 399 (1921), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The court affirmed the prior Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that Yee Won, a Chinese laundryman in San Francisco, was considered a laborer and not a merchant, thus denying his wife and children entry into the United States from China.

<p>The addition of 20 per cent of. sulphuric acid to a shipment of nitric acid, to render the lattér non-injurious to the steel tanks in which it is transported,-resulting in a mechanical mixture not intended or adapted as such to commercial use, does not take the merchandise' out of par. 387 of the free list, Tariff Act of 1913, and render it dutiable under par. 5, which imposes 15 per cent ad valorem on “all chemical and medicinal compounds, preparations, mixtures,” etc. P. 404.</p> <p>9 Oust. Ápp. Rep. 298, affirmed.</p>

<p>An order of the District Court remanding a case to the state court . can not be reviewed by this court by mandamus. P. 418. Jud. Code, § 28. -</p> <p>Rule discharged; petition dismissed.</p>

Held: That, assuming the corporations were doing business in North Carolina and were subject to her jurisdiction, the statute worked a discrimination against them, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 424. (2) That, without such assumption,, it discriminated against their products, in violation of the commerce clause. P. 426. 178'N. Car. 399, reversed.

Held: that this, did not constitute a' delivery of the goods and that a loss of part, occurring during the unloading and within the 48-hour period provided in the bill of lading ut supra, par. 1, must 1 be borne by the railroad. P. 431. 291 Illinois, 149, affirmed.

Held: That the obligation of the Choctaw Nation was to the delegates individually and not to the delegation as a body, and that the two existing delegates, in collecting and disbursing the money, were agents of the Nation merely, so that its payment to them did not discharge the Choctaw Nation’s obligation to the heirs of a former delegate who had rendered part of the service. P. 444.

<p>The Act of October 22, 1914, c. 331, 38 Stat. 754, imposed stamp taxes in respect of scheduled articles and commodities “manufactured, sold, or removed for sale,” including chewing-gum, taxed on its retail value, and required manufacturers at the end of each month to file a declaration that no such article or commodity had, during the preceding month, been removed, carried, sent, or caused, suffered or known to have been removed, carried or sent from their premises, other than such as had been duly taken account of and charged with the stamp tax. Held that, whether the tax was levied in respect of the sale or of the manufacture, a payment by the manufacturer was contemplated, and, when chewing-gum had been manufactured and prepared for sale, its removal to other factories and warehouses of the manufacturer for the purpose of future sale to wholesalers rendered the manufacturer liable. P. 448.</p> <p>Reversed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.</p> <p>Error to review a judgment of the District Court sustaining a motion to quash, and a demurrer to, an indictment. The facts are stated in the opinion, post, 457.</p> <p>• The revenue laws can be said to be inconsistent with the National Prohibition Act only in so far as they in- . terfere with its enforcement. In só far as their enforcement is an aid to the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, it cannot be said in the face of the express provision of Title II,' § 35, that the latter act repeals them.</p> <p>It has frequently been ruled that there is no inconsistency between taxing an article and prohibiting its production entirely. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Foster v. Speed, 120 Tennessee, 470; Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., p. 14; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Michigan, 406; Conwell v. Sears, 65 Ohio St. 49; State v. Moeling, 129 La. Ann. 204; Carpenter v. State, 120 Tennessee, 586; Webster v. Commonwealth, 89 Virginia, 154; State v. Smiley, 101 N. Car. 709; State v. Smith, 126 N. Car. 1057; Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Massachusetts, 281.</p> <p>Applying the principle of these cases to the case at bar, it is clear that the provision of Title II, § 35, of the National Prohibition Act, that the act shall not relieve anyone from paying the internal revenue tax imposed upon distilled spirits, should be construed to mean that .the tax must be paid upon such-spirits even though they are distilled without a permit. That is its literal meaning and the one best calculated to effect the purposes of the act. In view of the provision of Title II, § 3, that “all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented,” that is the construction which must be adopted.</p> <p>The purpose of the provision that “upon evidence of such illegal manufacture or sale the tax shall be assessed against and collected from the person responsible for such illegal manufacture or sale, in double the amount now provided by law,” is merely to confer upon the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that power to assess taxes where they have not been paid in the manner provided by law, which was conferred upon him by Rev. Stats.? § 3182, generally, and by Rev. Stats., § 3253, where distilled spirits are removed from the place where they were distilled without paying the tax upon them and without being deposited in a bonded warehouse. This power does not come into existence until after the distiller has failed to perform his duty with regard to paying the. tax on distilled spirits as defined by other laws.</p> <p>But the National Prohibition Act contains no provision as to the amount of the tax, nor how it shall be assessed, nor how or when it shall be paid, nor any measures to prevent its evasion. It is obvious, therefore, that for direction on all these matters the revenue laws- must be looked to. If the tax is not paid when it is due, the United States is defrauded and the distillers subjected to the penalties provided in Rev. Stats., § 3257.</p> <p>The prevention of the secret distillation of spirits is as necessary to the prevention of their distillation without, a permit as it is to prevent the evasion of the government tax on such spirits, and measures calculated to prevent such secret distillation do not interfere with but, on the contrary, are of material assistance in carrying out the purpose of the National Prohibition Act. It will not be contended that the sections here involved are actually inconsistent with any of its provisions. The failure of the National Prohibition Act to provide any means of .preventing the evasion of the tax which under its terms is imposed upon .distilled spirits shows that they were intended to be continued in force.</p> <p>It may be argued, however, that although the revenue laws are not actually inconsistent with the National Prohibition Act, they are repealed by it because it covers the whole subject-matter of the revenue laws and contains provisions plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for those laws.</p> <p>This contention is clearly unsound. The’National Prohibition Act does not provide a substitute for the system of government supervision of the production of distilled spirits established under the revenue laws. The only change which it makes in that respect is that since the act came into effect no distilled spirits can be produced at all except when authorized by a permit issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and then only in accordance with regulations prescribed by him and by other provisions of the act, none of which are in conflict with the provisions of the revenue laws. This is a necessary deduction from the fact that under the National Prohibition Act all distilled spirits, whether produced with or without a permit, are subject to an internal revenue tax.</p> <p>Since the act expresses the extent to which it was intended to repeal prior laws, the rule that, where a later act covers the same subject-matter as a prior one; it operates as an implied repeal óf such prior act, would have no, application, even if the Natibnál Prohibition Act did cover the same subject-matter as the revenue laws. United States v. Clafiin, 97 U. S. 546; Henderson’s Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 155 Fed. Rep. 945, 953, affd. 208 U. S. 452.</p> <p>It may be argued, however, that although the provisions of the revenue laws are not actually inconsistent with those of the National Prohibition Act, an intention to repeal the former must be presumed because the penalties embraced by the later statute are lighter than those imposed by the earlier one for the same offenses. But this presumption applies only where the offenses denounced by both statutes are the same. It does not apply if each offense embraces an element not embraced in the other, as is the case here.</p> <p>It is true that under some circumstances the same act may constitute a violation of both statutes, but since the offenses denounced by the revenue laws are not the same as those denounced by the National Prohibition Act, a person committing such an act may be prosecuted under both statutes. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 394; Gañeres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338; Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625. •</p> <p>. The act shows clearly the intention that a prosecution under it should not be a bar to prosecution for the same act if that act also constitutes an offense under the revenue laws, for it provides in Title II, § 35, “Nor shall this act relieve any person from any liability, civil or criminal, heretofore or hereafter incurred under existing laws.”</p> <p>The decisions of the lower federal courts sustain the Government’s contentions. United States v. Sohm, 265 Fed. Rep. 910; United States v. One Essex Touring Automobile, 266 Fed. Rep. 138; United States v. Turner, 266 Fed. Rep. 248. Contra: United States v. Windham, 264 Fed. Rep. 376; United States v. Puhac, 268 Fed. Rep. 392; United States v. Stafoff, 268 Fed. Rep. 417.</p> <p>Sections 3257, 3279, 3281, and 3282, Rev. Stats., are contrary to the Constitution as amended by the Eighteenth Amendment. The revenue laws are for the purpose of aiding the collection of the government revenue and taxes. United States v. Hill, 123 IT. S. 681, 686; United States v. Howell, 20 Fed. Rep. 718, 719; Hutton v. Terrill, 255 Fed. Rep. 860, 862. These sections, therefore, are not penal statutes intended to punish violations of a statute or the Constitution, but are mere means to assure the payment 6f taxes imposed in other sections of the same acts upon lawful and constitutional enterprises. Edwards v. Wabash Ry. Co., 264 Fed. Rep. 610.</p> <p>The constitutional policy of the United States on the liquor question is now shown by the Eighteenth Amendment, and these taxing statutes passed fifty years ago cannot be continued in opposition to that policy. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 474; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 61. “Subject to a compliance with the limitar tions in the Constitution, the taxing power of Congress extends to all usual objects of taxation.” Knowlton v. Moore, supra. Certainly the power does not extend to acts prohibited by the Constitution itself. The acts for which a tax is sought to be imposed and collected from the defendants are acts forbidden by the Constitution and made criminal by a statute passed to carry into effect the constitutional provision. While this court has never passed directly upon the proposition of laying a tax upon crime, it is a fundamental principle of morality and justice, no less than an indispensable requirement of a sound public policy, that Congress cannot lay a tax and attempt to collect a revenue .from an act that is forbidden by the Constitution. See License Tax Cases, supra, 469; People v. Raynes, 3 California, 366.</p> <p>The enforcement provisions of § 5, Title I, and § 28, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, merely confer the power to use existing governmental agencies formerly used to enforce laws now repealed. The intent of Congress was simply to turn over to the proper officers to enforce the new law the machinery built up in enforcing the prior law, and this fact in itself is an indication of the legislative intent to repeal existing laws designed to enforce payment of a tax.</p> <p>Section 35 of Title II, furnishes no authority for holding that the revenue laws affecting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors are not repealed by .the constitutional provision. That section provides that it “shall not relieve anyone from paying any taxes or other charges imposed upon the manufacture or traffic in such liquor.” “Such liquor” means liquor the manufacture and sale of which is permitted by the -act, i. e., liquor for non-beverage purposes and wine for sacramental purposes. The clause providing that “all provisions of law that are inconsistent” with the act are repealed, expressly repeals the sections of the Revised Statutes here in question. Those sections provide for a license for and a tax on the manufacture of that kind of liquor the manufacture of which is forbidden by the act itself, and hence are provisions of law “inconsistent” with the National Prohibition Act.</p> <p>When Congress seeks to superimpose upon the punishment for violation of the National Prohibition Act the additional punishment it heretofore had imposed for violation of the internal revenue laws, it clearly has exceeded its powers and infringed the constitutional rights of citizens under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.</p> <p>The sections of the Revised Statutes relating to intoxicating liquors were repealed by the National Prohibition Act. With the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment the public policy of the Nation changed and the liquor traffic became in itself an illegal and improper business. The National Prohibition Act was passed in furtherance of this changed public policy; it was intended to provide a complete'system, in and of itself, for. the regulation of intoxicating liquors for beverage and non-beverage purposes, tinder these circumstances the well-known rule of implied repeal of statutes must be applied. 22 Cye. 1606; United States v. Rdnlett, 172 U.. S. 133, 140, 141; Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 How. 636; New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. The Collector, 18 Wall. 478; Henderson’s Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652, 657; United States v. Barr, 24 Fed. Cas. 1016,1017; United States v. Cheeseman, 25 Fed. Cas. 416; Rogers v. Nashville &c. Ry. Co., 91.. Fed. Rep. 299, 323.</p> <p>' The National Prohibition Act is a penal, regulatory, and prohibitive statute. The .Revised Statutes, supra, are tax and revenue statutes pure and simple. There is a básic repugnancy that cannot be overcome, and even the attempted saving clause of the National Prohibition Act is not sufficient to prevent the application of the well-settled rules of law. '</p> <p>The National Prohibition Act also comes within the rule that a statute covering the whole subject-matter of a former one, adding offenses and varying the procedure, operates, not cumulatively, but by way of substitution, and impliedly repeals the former. United States v. Claflin, 97 XJ. S. 546, 551; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 438.</p> <p>In this connection the rule of clemency has application. A subsequent statute imposing milder penalties impliedly repeals any former act on the subject. Smith-v. State, 1 Stew. 506; State v. Whitworth, 8 Port. 434; People v. Tisdale, 57 California, 104; Hayes v. State, 55 Indiana, 99; United States v. Windham, 264 Fed. Rep. 376. In every instance, the penalties for violations set forth in the National Prohibition Act are not as severe as those contained in the Revised Statutes.</p>

Held: is ho more entitled to its return than one who has been arrested for carrying a pistol is entitled to have the pistol returned to him pending a trial. It must always be remembered that “a party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 , 458.

Held: adopting the practical construction of the Land Department, that where an existing first-form withdrawal under the Reclamation Act prevented the land from becoming open to entry for more than thirty days after the notice of cancelation issued, a successful contestant of a homestead entry had thirty days after the tract was restored to public entry within which to exercise his preferred right.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: as did Wea, under a patent in fee, even though, the land was subject to a restriction upon alienation; Before coming to the acts under which the Secretary of the Interior proceeded, it will be helpful to refer to the modes, long in use, by which Indians are prevented from improvidently disposing of allotted lands.

Held: that these proceedings against the Superintendent were in personam, and, considering his functions under the state laws and the ultimate *491 incidence of the relief sought, were essentially proceedings against-the State, beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, in admiralty. P. 501. Workman v. New York City, 179 TJ. S. 552, distinguished. Rule absolute for a writ of prohibition.

<p>ON PETITION FOR WRIT OP PROHIBITION ANd/oR WRIT OP MANDAMUS.</p>

Held: That the court below had jurisdiction, through a special master, to ascertain the amounts collected by the company from its customers, in excess of the ordinance rate, pending the litigation, and to require repayment thereof, with interest, in accordance with the terms of a bond that the company filed in the cause in order to obtain a supersedeas, with continuance of injunction, pending its appeal. P. 516.

<p>1. The authority of the Secretary of the Interior under § 2 of the Act of May 27,1908, c. 199, 35 Stat. 312, to approve an oil and gas lease made by a full-blood Creek allottee is not taken away, under § 9, by the death of the allottee. P. 522.</p> <p>2. As respects the rights of the allottee’s heirs and those claiming under thém with'notice of such outstanding lease, the approval relates back and takes effect as of the execution of the lease by the parties named therein. P. 522.</p> <p>3. Under the Act of March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1026, the lodging of such lease in the office of the United States Indian Agent (now Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes) at Muskogee, for ' transmission to the Secretary of the Interior, constituted constructive notice to persons who, after the death of the lessor and after the lease had been approved by the Secretary, took another lease from the lessor’s heirs. P. 522.</p> <p>4. The provision of the Act of March 1, 1907, making the filing of Indian .léases with the- Indian Agent at Muskogee constructive notice, was not superseded by the admission of Oklahoma as a State or as a result of provisions in the Enabling Act of June 16,1906, and in the state constitution adopted thereunder. P. 523.</p> <p>257 Fed. Rep. 277, affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Revised Statutes, § 2078, declaring that “No person employed in Indian affairs shall have any interest or concern in any trade with the Indians, except for, and on account of, the United States,” and subjecting the offender to a pecuniary penalty and removal from office, includes transactions with tribal Indians involving land or other property in respect of which the Government has no interest or control. P. 526.</p> <p>2. This section defines an offense against the United States, within the meaning of Crim. Code, § 37, whether it be itself punishable through a criminal prosecution or only through civil action for the penalty. P. 528.</p> <p>Reversed.</p>

<p>Decided upon'the authority of United States v. HvXto, No. 1, ante, 524. Reversed.</p>

This was a suit brought in the District Court by the present appellants to avoid and enjoin enforcement of a special street improvement tax. The appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of'Appeals reversing a judgment in their favor. The facts are stated in the opinion, post, 534.

Held: That the words “at which there is no regularly appointed agent” apply to both clauses, ,(p. 544) and (2) that, where goods had been loaded ihto an outgoing car on a spur-used generally by the public, which ran parallel to the main.track and connected with it-néar a station having, such an agent, and a bill of lading had issued; the goods were at the carrier’s risk while the car remained there waiting to be attached…

Held: referring to the legislative history of the act and to other acts in pari materia, that the jurisdiction under § 10 is conferred exclusively on the District Courts as part of their ordinary jurisdiction over actions at law for money,' of which the right to trial by jury is An incident, and that a judgment rendered under that. section is therefore not reviewable in this court by direct writ of error. P. 550.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>Error to -review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, affirming a judgment against the plaintiffs in error in an action to recover wages and a penalty. The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A railroad corporation, while its road was.under federal control, was . • not liable for a penalty prescribed by a state law, for delay in de- - livery of an intrastate shipment. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v.</p> <p>Ault, ante, 554.</p> <p>178 N. Car. 325, reversed.</p>

Held: Whatever the legal incidents of the transmission over the foreign lines, the company in carrying the message over its own lines from . Havre was governed by the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended. P. 57Ó. 2.

Held: that, there being no authority to contract in excess of the appropriation, no contract . of the Government to pay the fair value of the excess work could be implied, either because the contractor was thus misled into doing it or from the subsequent usa of the excavation by the Government. P. 580. 4.

Held: that the building regulations were not to be looked to for grants in the streets, and that the permits were to be strictly construed and were mere licenses, revocable by the District Government at its discretion. P. 586. 2.

Held: That this plan of distribution, part of a complex scheme designed to correct inequalities and prevent evasion, cannot be interfered with, as in violation.of the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the ground that,. in operation, it returns to the plaintiff’s town less income.tax than he and its other inhabitants pay,- and distributes the overplus to other, subdivisions which may elect to use it for their local purposes not…

<p>1. The questions whether a ship of a foreign government, which it uses ar.d operates as a merchant vessel, is, within the waters of the United States, immune from process in admiralty suits to enforce claims for wharfage and supplies, and whether such immunity properly can be claimed for a ship of a government which has severed and not resumed diplomatic relations with the United States, are debatable questions. P. 618.</p> <p>2. The granting or refusal of the writs of prohibition and mandamus to restrain and correct alleged excesses of jurisdiction by the District Court in admiralty, is discretionary when the jurisdiction of that 'court is debatable. P. 619.</p> <p>Leave denied.</p>

decree of the Circyit Court of Appeals affirming á decree of the District Court in admiralty. The facts are stated in the opinion, post, 625. In the absence of a restraints-of-princes clause, the shipowner’s obligation under the chartérparty was absolute, and prevention by foreign law was not a defense. Where a shipowner enters into an absolute covenant to carry a cargo, without protecting himself by exceptions; he is bound to perform it or to pay damages.

Held: That “estate taxes,” imposed by-the Revenue'jkct of 1916, are among the taxes deductible. . (See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, ante, 345.) P. 634. " ■ ■ .

<p>1. A judgment of a state supreme court sustaining a state statute and a city ordinance imposing taxes, over the objection that as construed and applied they are repugnant to a law of the' United States, is reviewable here by writ of error. P. 637.</p> <p>•2. Where the state court omits to find the facts relevant to a question of federal law, it is the duty of this court to examine the evidence . . . on the' subject. P. 638.</p> <p>3. In the provision of Rev.' Stats.,, § 5219, respecting state taxation of shares of national banks, that it “shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State,”-the words “moneyed capital in the hands of individual ■ citizens ” include bonds, notes- and. other evidences' of •indebtedness in the hands of individuals, which'are shown, to come materially into competition with the national banks in the loan market. P. 638.</p> <p>12á Virginia, 522, reversed;'- application for. writ of certiorari denied*</p>

Held: — . ' ■ (1) That the excise provision, assuming it intended to include both . interstate and domestic transactions, is not therefore void in tato, in its application to a distributer engaged in both, since, the subject-matter being separable', full protection can be afforded by enjoining enforcement as to the interstate business. P. 646.

Held: that the principle of Barnes v. District of Columbia applies, notwithstanding the form of the District government . had been changed. In Roth v. District of Columbia, 16 App. D. C. 323 ; Brown v. District of Columbia, 29 App. D. C. 273 ; District of Columbia v. Tyrrell, 41 App. D. C. 463 ; and Coates v. District of Columbia, 42 App.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP ARKANSAS.</p> <p>Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court, of Arkansas which affirmed a judgment of a circuit court approving a road improvement assessment on property of the plaintiffs in error. The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR' THE THIRD CIRCUIT. ’</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error, to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District, of New York:</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court, of Appeals for the Third. Circuit.</p>

<p>Error.-to the District Court of.Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division No. 1, of the State of California.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>