Ex Parte Register’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Time within which any act is provided by law to be done must be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. * * *””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taxpayers & Citizens of Cleburne County v. Cleburne County · Johnson v. Salter

2. ““. . . In the first place, the alternative writ in mandamus is not process, merely, but both process and pleading. In strictness, it is the thing to be answered by the respondent, and it should therefore, by way of premises for and inducement to its mandate, set out the facts upon which the relator bases his right. This writ makes no pretense in that direction. Then the writ must alternatively command a thing to be done, or that the respondent should appear and show cause why a peremptory writ ' should not issue, commanding him to do that thing. In all cases the respondent has the right to do the act in question, and to an opportunity to do it or enter upon its execution, and make return of the fact in answer to the writ. It is only when and in the event he fails to perform the act that he must show cause against being compelled to per- •• form. . ■ “If the answer to a proper alternative writ is [in] sufficient (that is shows no cause against the right- to a peremptory mandamus asserted by the relator), it -. is unnecessary to demur to it or to move to quash it. The court will consider the case presented [f]or the relator on the petition and alternative writ, and for the respondent on his answer, determine the insufficiency of the answer, and award the peremptory writ without any challenge of the answer by motion ox-demurrer. If such motion or demurrer is interposed and sustained, it is only another way of determining the insufficiency of the answer, and by thus proceeding th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Guaranty Funding Corporation v. Bolling

3. ““ * * * In Garner v. Johnson, 22 Ala. 494 , and Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547 , a distinction is drawn when the statute requires a certain number of ‘entire days.’ It is doubtful if this principle was properly applied in Sims v. Sims, 210 Ala. 465 , 98 So. 462 . * * *””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taxpayers & Citizens of Cleburne County v. Cleburne County