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← 257 F.2d 541 - Johnson v. Sword Line, Inc.

Johnson v. Sword Line, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

257 F.2d 541 · 1958

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
July 1981
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 1981 · most notably Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co. (1981), Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Wynn (1964)

13 federal appellate · 1 district ·

1001958196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 901 · 33 U.S.C. § 905 · 33 U.S.C. § 914 · 33 U.S.C. § 933

Relies on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. · Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co. · Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson · Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. · Czaplicki v. the Hoegh Silvercloud

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Any amount recovered by such employer on account of such assignment, whether or not as the result of a compromise, shall be distributed as follows: (1) The employer shall retain an amount equal to- (A) the expenses incurred by him in respect to such proceedings or compromise (including a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the deputy commission or Board); (B) the cost of all benefits actually furnished by him to the employee under section 907 of this title; (C) all amounts paid as compensation; (D) the present value of all amounts thereafter payable as compensation, such present value to be computed in accordance with a schedule prepared by the Secretary, and the present value of the cost of all benefits thereafter to be furnished under section 907 of this title, to be estimated by the deputy commissioner, and the amounts so computed and estimated to be retained by the employer as a trust fund to pay such compensation and the cost of such benefits as they become due, and to pay any sum finally remaining in excess thereof to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative; and (2) The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the employer.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““Applying the doctrine of Ryan, if the cause of the longshoreman’s injury is the stevedoring company’s negligence, the shipowner would be entitled to maintain a separate action against the stevedoring company for indemnification, and this may be so in some instances even-though the shipowner was also negligent. Since any recovery by the-injured employee against the shipowner could be recouped in an action by the shipowner against thestevedoring company, the practical effect of the Ryan case is to cause-the employer-stevedoring companies,, who may anticipate a shipowner’s, claim to indemnity to resist the making of any payment to the injured' stevedore until an award is made, at which time the assignment of the-cause of action by reason of the provisions of the statute takes place. When the statutory assignment has-taken place the employer-stevedoringcompany will then refuse to bring an action against the shipowner, and by the same token would also refuse-to re-assign the cause of action to-the injured stevedore, for to do so-might result in an eventual high award by way of indemnification against the stevedoring company and hence against the insurance carrier.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““a vessel owner found liable to a longshoreman injured as a result of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel was entitled to recover damages, when appropriate, from the stevedore under a theory that by a breach of the warranty of workmanlike service the stevedore or its employees caused or contributed to cause the condition on the vessel which gave rise to the longshoreman’s recovery.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.