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← 257 F.3d 309 - Doe v. Delie

Doe v. Delie’s Empirical Analysis

257 F.3d 309 · 2001

Citation profile

137
cited by 137 later decisions
3
states following
October 2024
most recently cited

36 federal appellate · 23 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 137 later decisions — most recently October 2024 · most notably Kim Brown, Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp. (2004)

36 federal appellate · 23 district · 4 state decisions

880200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 28 U.S.C. § 1915 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1997E

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Katz v. United States · Anderson v. Creighton · Wolff v. McDonnell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 137 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “There are at least two types of privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the right to autonomy and independence in personal decision-making. See Whalen v. Roel 429 U.S. [589,] 599-600, 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 [(1977)]; [United States v.] Westinghouse [Elec. Corp.], 638 F.2d [570,] 577 [(3d Cir. 1995) ].... As described above, [the appellant’s] privacy interest clearly falls into the first category. Some courts have referred to the first category as a “right to confidentiality,” to distinguish it from the right to autonomy and independence in personal decision making. E.g. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir.1999). It is beyond question that information about one’s HIV-positive status is information of the most personal kind and that an individual has an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such information. See Doe v. [Southeastern Pa. Transp. Autho.] 72 F.3d [1133,] 1140 [ (3d Cir.1995) ]; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577. Moreover, a prisoner’s right to privacy in this medi cal information is not fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. Therefore, we join the Second Circuit in recognizing that the constitutional right to privacy in one’s medical information exists in prison. See Powell, 175 F.3d at 112 . We acknowledge, however, that a prisoner does not enjoy a right of privacy in his medical information to the same extent as a free citizen. We do not suggest th”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.