Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

58 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““However, where the in-court identification is challenged as having been subjected to the improper influence of an unlawful confrontation, the occurrence of which has been brought to light by the defendant, the prosecution will be given the opportunity, and must carry the corresponding burden, to establish by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification was free of taint from the illegal one. The application of this rules will compel law enforcement authorities to exercise all due care to assure the opportunity of the presence of counsel at out-of-court identification confrontations but will, nevertheless, avert the loss to the state of valid identification testimony in those rare cases where the witness may have been erroneously subjected to the improper influence, unless the state commits the additional error of capitalizing upon that influence.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dearman v. State · 157 Ind. App. 83 - Hutts v. State

2. “"Error, standing alone, however, does not compel reversal. It must also be shown that the complaining party was harmed by such error... ." Johnson v. State (1972), Ind., 278 N.E.2d 577, 580 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garland v. State · 162 Ind. App. 543 - Burnett v. State

3. ““ . . . Better practice dictates that the questions be presented and determined at a pre-trial hearing upon a motion to suppress. Absent prior knowledge of an out-of-court identification, the matter could be gone into by preliminary questioning, out of the presence of the jury, at the time the in-court identification testimony is tendered. The question not having arisen by either of the foregoing methods, the defendant, at best, runs the risk of having the trier of the facts subjected to questionable testimony unnecessarily and a subsequent determination of whether it was error or prejudicial. The disadvantages inherent in awaiting the cross examination stages to raise the question are self evident. . . ” 278 N.E.2d at 580 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State