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← 257 KAN 964 - State v. Haddock

State v. Haddock’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

80
cited by 80 later decisions
5
states following
November 2020
most recently cited

2 district · 76 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 80 later decisions — most recently November 2020 · most notably State v. King (2009), State v. Harvey (1997)

2 district · 76 state decisions

4001995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Doyle v. Ohio · Davis v. United States · Frye v. United States · Amperex Electronic Corp. v. New York Racing Assn., Inc. · Anderson v. Charles

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 80 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The admission or exclusion of evidence, subject to exclusionaiy rules, is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Coleman, 253 Kan. 335, 344 , 856 P.2d 121 (1993). Discretion is abused only when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court’s view. State v. Baker, 255 Kan. 680 Syl. ¶ 9, 877 P.2d 946 (1994).””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"Custody would not matter if Haddock was contending that his statements were obtained through coercion, threats, or duress, or other involuntary means violating due process. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir.1987) (noting that even if Miranda rights are not violated, statements may be inadmissible if made involuntarily). However, the `constitutional rights' Haddock seeks to enforce—the safeguards against self-incrimination established by Miranda —do not exist outside `custodial interrogation.' See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir.1994); State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, 597 , 802 P.2d 558 (1990) (` Miranda only applies if the interrogation was custodial.'). Although we have never addressed the question directly, other courts have held that the giving of Miranda warnings, itself, does not transform a noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686 , 693 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 863 [ 98 S.Ct. 193 , 54 L.Ed.2d 137 ]." 257 Kan. at 976-77 , 897 P.2d 152 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Mere evidence of an altercation, however, does not alone support a finding of sufficient provocation. We have found the evidence insufficient for a voluntary manslaughter instruction in spite of evidence of some kind of altercation between the defendant and victim just before the killing. [Citations omitted.] “In State v. Coleman, 253 Kan. 335, 352-54 , 856 P.2d 121 (1993), we clarified prior cases in holding that evidence supporting a lesser included offence instruction may be presented either by the defendant or the State. In the case at bar, however, neither Haddock nor the State presented evidence of precisely what provoked or preceded Barbara’s murder. The person who could have supplied the missing evidence of provocation in this case was the last person to see her alive. Haddock, however, denied having any kind of altercation with his wife.” (Emphasis added.) 257 Kan. at 987 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.