Smith v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis
1970
Citation profile
17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently April 2014
17 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Moran v. Moran · Hamilton v. Hamilton · Cullotta v. Cullotta · Maranto v. Maranto · Stewart v. Stewart
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We have held that the requirements for a divorce a vinculo on the ground of voluntary separation are threefold. There must be an express or an implied mutual agreement between the parties to separate accompanied by a mutual intent not to resume the marriage relationship. E.g., Wilner v. Wilner, 251 Md. 13, 24 (1968), and the cases therein cited; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 234 Md. 67, 72 (1964). The parties must voluntarily have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for at least 18 consecutive months. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 245 (1966) (dictum); and Lillis v. Lillis, 235 Md. 490 (1964). Proof that the separation is beyond any reasonable hope of reconciliation is the third requirement. “That every element must be corroborated is well settled. Code, Art. 35, § 4 as amended (1969 Cum. Supp.) ; see Fuller v. Fuller, 249 Md. 28 (1968); and Smith v. Smith, 225 Md. 282 (1961). However, in a contested divorce case where there is no basis for inferring collusion the corroboration need only be slight. E.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 256 Md. 272 , 260 A. 2d 71 (1969).” Id. at 266. (emphasis in original)”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““In all actions for divorce an offer of reconciliation or an attempt to reconcile by one spouse without the concurrence of the other spouse shall not be available as a defense to a divorce nor in and of itself be a bar to a divorce; nor shall the refusal of a spouse to accept an offer of reconciliation made by the other spouse or the rejection by a spouse of any attempt at reconciliation made by the other spouse be available as a defense to a divorce nor in and of itself be a bar to or a ground for a divorce.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.