257 Pa. Super. 110 - Arnold v. Borbonus’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
56
cited by 56 later decisions
1
states following
February 1984
most recently cited
3 federal appellate · 35 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Wiegand v. Wiegand · Maio v. Fahs · Singer v. Sheppard · Socha v. Metz · Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(b) In the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party, then such employe, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their action at law against such third party, but the employer, his insurance carrier, their servants and agents, employes, representatives acting on their behalf or at their request shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence which gave rise to the action.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“In his Concurring Opinion in Hefferin , Judge VAN der VOORT addressed appellant’s specific contention that joinder of the employer is not barred by § 303(b) if the joinder is intended to adjudicate the employer’s subrogation rights: “The amending Act creates many questions which it ignores, the most obvious of which questions are as follows: “In the event judgment goes against the third party defendant, does he have a right of set-off or recoupment for the amount of compensation paid or to be paid to the injured plaintiff? . “Does the employer have a right of subrogation against the third party, and if so, how is this to be determined? Since the employer can no longer be joined under the provisions of the Act, not only questions of procedure will arise, but also questions of collateral estoppel. Despite the shortcomings, I believe it is the intention of the Legislature to preclude the joining of the employer by an alleged third party tortfeasor.” Supra at 370, 372 A.2d at 872 . We agree that the 1974 amendment to § 303(b) manifests a broad legislative intent to bar the joinder of an employer as an additional defendant, (fn. omitted) Therefore,' we conclude that the lower court properly sustained appellee’s preliminary objections, (emphasis supplied)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Since Hefferin , however, the employer may not be joined as an additional defendant. The result is that one of two equally negligence tortfeasors — the third party — bears the entire burden of the judgment. Since the employer is not— cannot be — a party to the suit, the third party cannot get contribution from the employer commensurate with the employer’s fault. The employee, on the other hand, may have the opportunity to recover twice: once by the full judgment against the third party, and once through workmen’s compensation; for if the employer comes against the employee for subrogation, the employee may defend on the ground that the employer was at fault and is thus disabled from getting reimbursed through subrogation. If the employee fails, or is not permitted to prove the employer’s fault, the employer will recoup the workmen’s compensation payments and thus in the end pay nothing — despite having been at fault. Either outcome — a double recovery for the employee, or a negligent employer who pays nothing — represents an injustice; additionally, the third party is forced to bear the full burden of the judgment when he was only partially at fault. 3 (emphasis added). I find it impossible to believe that the Legislature could have intended such a result. Yet the language of § 481(b) is difficult to interpret otherwise, as Judge VAN der VOORT observed in his concurring opinion in Hefferin . Judge PRICE’S dissents in Hefferin and in the present case offer an appealing alterna”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.