Mugalli v. Ashcroft’s Empirical Analysis
258 F.3d 52 · 2001
Citation profile
29 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently January 2023 · most notably SILVA-TREVINO (2015), United States v. Austin (2005)
29 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2242 · 18 U.S.C. § 2243 · 18 U.S.C. § 2246 · 18 U.S.C. § 3509 · 18 U.S.C. § 513 · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Taylor v. United States · Immigration and Naturalization Service, v. Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre · Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc. · Deboris Calcano-Martinezs v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]t is not necessary that we conclude that the agency's interpretation of the statute is the only permissible interpretation, nor that we believe it to be the best interpretation of the statute. Rather, in order to affirm the BIA's determination, we need only conclude that its interpretation is reasonable and that it considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“is consonant with the general understood broad meaning of the term `sexual abuse'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“At Chevron step one, we consider de novo whether Congress has clearly spoken to the question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. To ascertain Congress’s intent, we begin with the statutory text because if its language is unambiguous, no further inquiry is necessary.... If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we resort first to canons of statutory construction, and, if the statutory meaning remains ambiguous, to legislative history, to see if these interpretive clues clearly reveal Congress’s intent. If we determine that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, we proceed to Chevron step two, which instructs us to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long as it is reasonable. While unpublished BIA decisions do not constitute agency interpretations of law warranting Chevron deference, where, as in this case, the challenged unpublished decision relies on a binding published decision, Chevron deference will extend to that earlier decision’s reasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Higgins v. Holder
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.