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← 258 F.3d 867 - Helseth v. Burch

Helseth v. Burch’s Empirical Analysis

258 F.3d 867 · 2001

Citation profile

41
cited by 41 later decisions
1
states following
December 2020
most recently cited

29 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably Terrell v. Larson (2005), Meals v. City of Memphis (2007)

29 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

270200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on County of Sacramento v. Lewis · Tennessee v. Garner · Whitley v. Albers · Brower v. County of Inyo · Betts v. Brady

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender ... only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]o reject intent-to-harm as the governing standard whenever a judge or a jury could say, with the wisdom of hindsight, that an officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit had ‘ample time to deliberate’ ... produces a standard that eviscerates the holding of Leiois [.][I]t also gives too little recognition to the Court’s other bases for that holding-iis historical reluctance “to expand the concept of sub stantive due process,” ... [and] its recognition that police officers confronting high-speed lawlessness are “subject to countervailing [law] enforcement considerations ”. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “that the intent-to-harm standard of Lewis applies to all § 1983 substantive due process claims based upon the conduct of public officials engaged in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.