Lovelace v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “an `arrest' that is effected by issuing a citation or summons rather than taking the suspect into custody”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 41 Va. App. 404 - Hunt v. Commonwealth · 47 Va. App. 55 - Moore v. Commonwealth

2. “Initially, we conclude that Knowles is applicable. The encounter between Lovelace and the officers, while not involving a traffic offense, was nonetheless similar in nature and duration to a routine traffic stop. We reach this conclusion primarily because the initial reason for detaining Lovelace was his alleged commission of a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the issuance of a summons was authorized under Code § 19.2-74(A)(2). Only if Lovelace had failed or refused to discontinue the unlawful act could the officer have effected a custodial arrest and taken the defendant before a magistrate. Code § 19.2-74(A)(2). However, there is no evidence in the record that Lovelace acted in such a manner. The fact that the officers could have issued only a summons for the alcohol-related offense also negates the Commonwealth's argument that the existence of probable cause to charge Lovelace with drinking an alcoholic beverage in public allowed [Deputy] Womack to search him. After Knowles , an "arrest" that is effected by issuing a citation or summons rather than taking the suspect into custody does not, by itself, justify a full field-type search. Nor do we believe that Code § 19.2-74(A)(2) contemplates a custodial situation equivalent to an actual custodial arrest. Under that statute, a suspect is detained, or in the custody of the police officer, only long enough for the officer to take down the name and address of the person and issue a summons. One of the reasons that the Knowles Court ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 41 Va. App. 404 - Hunt v. Commonwealth · Moore v. Com.

3. “[ Knowles holds that] the nature and duration of [a traffic stop] are significantly different and less threatening than in the case of an officer effecting a custodial arrest, [so] the rationales justifying a full field-type search are not sufficient to authorize such a search incident to the issuance of a citation. [But] when a police officer issues a citation or summons in lieu of a custodial arrest, the officer can nevertheless impose some further intrusions, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, if either historical rationale for the "search incident to arrest" exception is present [so long as] the scope of these further intrusions is limited to what is necessary to answer the concerns raised by the presence of either historical rationale. In other words, an encounter between a police officer and an individual that is similar to a routine traffic stop and results in the issuance of a citation or summons may involve some degree of danger to the officer or some need to preserve or discover evidence sufficient to warrant an additional intrusion, but it will not necessarily justify a full field-type search.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 41 Va. App. 404 - Hunt v. Commonwealth · McGuire v. State