In Re Dalen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) the probability of success in litigation in comparison to the present and future benefits offered by the settlement. (2) the prospect of complex and protracted litigation if the settlement is not approved; (3) the degree to which the settlement is supported by parties in interest; (4) the competency and experience of counsel who support the settlement; (5) the relative benefits to be received by members of any affected class; (6) the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors; and (7) the extent to which settlement is the product of arms length bargaining.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Novak · In Re Engman

2. “Bankruptcy judges administer the present bankruptcy system [under the Bankruptcy Act], and are responsible for the administration of individual bankruptcy cases. Their administrative, supervisory, and clerical functions in these matters are in addition to their judicial duties in bankruptcy cases, The situation is in marked contrast to most litigation, in which the parties themselves manage the progress of the case. The judge does not become involved in the case, and if a party fails to take action, the judge does not intercede on his behalf. Instead, the party is foreclosed. The bankruptcy judges have stepped in to perform the supervisory role because of the dearth of creditor participation. The Bankruptcy Act provides for the default of creditor control by vesting the creditors’ normal functions in the bankruptcy judge when the creditors do not exercise them. The bankruptcy judge is required to appoint a trustee in liquidation cases when creditors do not elect one. The bankruptcy judge supervises the trustee in the performance of his duties, often suggesting causes of action that the trustee might pursue to recover assets for the estate. The bankruptcy judge reviews nearly all transactions that trustees enter into, and rules, usually ex parte, on their propriety. The bankruptcy judge frequently entertains requests for instructions from trustees for even the most routine matters.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Novak

3. “A trustee’s decision to settle an estate claim is more akin to decisions for which court approval is not permitted than to decisions for which court approval is mandatory. As already discussed, nothing obligates the trustee to seek court approval of a proposed settlement. It is discretionary. If the trustee were to forgo court approval and if a creditor were to challenge the trustee’s decision to settle at some later date (e.g., through an objection to fees), the court would evaluate that decision in the same manner as it would for any other trustee decision for which prior court approval was not permitted. That is, the court would determine whether the challenge has merit based upon the standard of what an ordinarily prudent person might do. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Weaver, 680 F.2d at 461-62. In reality, Rule 9019(a) is nothing more than a free pass for the trustee to secure declaratory relief regarding her personal exposure with respect to compromises and settlements made by her on behalf of the estate. The issue is the same whether she seeks validation of her decision prior to consummating the settlement through this declaratory process or waits until a creditor challenges her decision to secure vindication.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Engman