Lewis v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1972
Citation profile
14 federal appellate · 2 district · 220 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 248 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2018 · most notably 191 Ill. 2d 37 - In Re GO (2000), Riley v. Illinois (1978)
14 federal appellate · 2 district · 220 state decisions — followed in 25 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Johnson v. Zerbst · Brady v. United States · Gault · Von Moltke v. Gillies
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 248 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"`The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and minors. Indeed the juvenile justice system . . . is substantially different in philosophy and procedure from the adult system. This State, like all the others, has recognized the fact that juveniles many times lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of their actions. As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important . . . rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.' (Citations omitted.)" Ex parte Whisenant , 466 So.2d at 1010-11 (Torbert, C.J., concurring in pertinent part), quoting Lewis v. State , 259 Ind. 431 , 437 , 288 N.E.2d 138 , 141 (1972).”
11 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Ex Parte Whisenant · In Re BMB“"... a juvenile’s statement or confession cannot be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his rights to an attorney, and to remain silent. Furthermore, the child must be given an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he wishes to waive those rights. After such consultation the child may waive his rights if he so chooses provided of course that there are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present.” Id., at —. 288 N. E. 2d at 142 .”
11 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Andrews v. State · Bridges v. State““It is a long and well established principle that alleged waivers of such fundamental constitutional rights as the right to counsel and against self-incrimination will only be upheld after careful inquiry into their basis. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. Ed. 1461 ; Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S. Ct. 1463 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 . The State bears the burden of showing that the accused was informed of his rights in clear and unambiguous language. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ; United States ex rel. William v. Twomey, 467 F. 2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972). If an accused decides to waive these rights he must be sufficiently aware of the consequences of what he is doing and he must make his decision voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Nacoff v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 97 , 267 N.E.2d 165 ; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37 , 262 N.E.2d 638 . In order to insure that the accused’s waiver is a knowing and intelligent one the courts have considered such factors as his educational level, the seriousness and complexity of the charge lodged against him, his mental condition, and his age. Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948), 332 U.S. 708 , 68 S. Ct. 316 , 92 L. Ed. 309 ; Williams v. Peyton, 404 F. 2d 528 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Day v. United States, 357 F. 2d 907 (7th Cir. 1966).” See, also, Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 689 , 276 N.E.2d 845 ; Jones v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 23”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.