DeVaney v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1972
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 114 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 120 later decisions — most recently August 2016 · most notably State v. Grant (2008), Rowan v. State (1982)
6 federal appellate · 114 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Schmerber v. State of California · Harrington v. California · Schneble v. Florida
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 120 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ ‘This change in judicial opinion has resulted from the fact that the rule excluding opinion on ultimate facts in issue is unduly restrictive, pregnant with close questions of application and the possibility of misapplication, and often unfairly obstructive to the presentation of a party’s case, to say nothing concerning the illogic of the idea that these opinions usurp the function of the jury.’ [quoting McCormick on Evidence, 27-28 2nd ed. 1972)]. The argument that such an opinion usurps the function of the jury is simply not valid. When the opinion is given, the witness has no such intent and could not accomplish this feat even if he wanted to for the simple reason that the jury is free to reject the opinion and accept some other view. We therefore hold that an opinion by an expert witness upon an ultimate fact in issue is not excludable for that reason. To the extent that prior cases, including Stroud [v. State (1971) [257] Ind. [204], 273 N.E.2d 842 ;] Ellis [v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 472 , 250 N.E.2d 364 ;] Baker [v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 129 , 195 N.E.2d 91 ], are in conflict with this holding they are hereby overruled. Assuming the matter upon which the expert in the case at bar testified was an ultimate fact in issue, it was not error to permit it in light of our holding.””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage““Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence concerning a blood sample taken from the appellant. Appellant claims the taking violated his constitutional rights. He relies on Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The pertinent portion of Art. 1, § 11 reads: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure, shall not be violated ...’ [Emphasis by the Court in DeVaney.] It is clear that the taking of a blood sample is an intrusion meant to be limited by these constitutional protections. See, Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 . Schmerber concerned the validity of a blood test administered by the police after the defendant had been involved in an auto accident. At the scene of the accident the police noted that the defendant had liquor on his breath and that his eyes were bloodshot. They noticed these same characteristics when they saw appellant in the hospital two hours later. The Supreme Court held that probable cause was present for the test, and, due to the fact that the evidence might soon disappear, exigent circumstances were present making the acquisition of a search warrant unnecessary. Schmerber is practically on all fours with the case at bar. In appellant’s case, he was involved in an auto accident and the poli”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““Are the facts that appellant crossed the center line and that he was intoxicated, together, sufficient to constitute reckless homicide? Although, a closer question, again we think not.... If that alone were sufficient to constitute reckless homicide then the parallel crime of causing the death of another while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors contained in the same statute would be superfluous and unnecessary. It seems clear that the legislature intended to provide for two distinct crimes and that reckless homicide required something more than causing the death of another while driving under the influence.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.