State v. Bryan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The constitutionality of a statute is presumed. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the act may be stricken down it must clearly appear that the statute violates the constitution. In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt."”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Scott · State v. Hebert

2. “‘The constitutionality of a statute is presumed. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the act may be stricken down it must clearly appear that the statute violates the constitution. In determining constitutionality, it is the court’s duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt.’ ” [Citation omitted.] “ ‘In relation to the specific complaint of vagueness, this court stated: “.[T]he void-for-vagueness analysis is based upon a due process requirement that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite unless its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning of the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice. [Citation omitted].” [Citation omitted.] In State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418 , 662 P.2d 1286 (1983), the test was stated as “whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice. A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process.” . . . “ Tn addition to the inquiry whether the proscribed conduct is adequately defined, the c”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Rucker · City of Wichita v. Hackett

3. “(a) Stalking is an intentional and malicious following or course of conduct directed at a specific person when such following or course of conduct seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. (d) For the purposes of this section ‘course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.'”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Galloway v. State · State v. Rucker