[Cite as State v. Casto-Triplett,
2024-Ohio-5670.]
COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
:
MARIE CASTO-TRIPLETT, : Case No. 2024 CA 00006
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
2023 CR 0062
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: December 2, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
R. KYLE WITT CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY
Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney 9200 Montgomery Rd., Suite 8A
Cincinnati, Ohio 45242
By: BRIAN T. WALTZ
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
239 West Main Street, Suite 101
Lancaster, Ohio 43130
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} The appellant appeals her conviction and sentence on two counts of
intimidation. Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} The appellant was a litigant in a small claims court case assigned to
Magistrate T.I. The appellant, who had a long history with the Magistrate and the Clerk’s
office, expressed frustration and anger towards both during the course of her case. The
Magistrate and the Clerk’s office were familiar with the appellant, who had previously
made vague statements and threats to court personnel.
{¶3} On or about January 27, 2023, the appellant called the Clerk’s office to
express her anger at the court system, stating that the court system was stealing from
her, and making veiled threats about the Magistrate, specifically stating that he had
“another thing coming.” On January 31, 2023, the appellant called the Clerk’s office yet
again, very upset. She made numerous statements to Deputy Clerk S.V., telling her that
she was on the “wrong side of the government and God”. The appellant further stated
that S.V. was “evil for working for the government”, and again accused the Clerk’s office
of stealing from her. The appellant then stated that “you guys need to watch your backs
when you go out in that back parking lot after work because anyone can sit out there and
watch for you.” These statements were so substantially different from the appellant’s prior
veiled comments and threats, and was so concerning to S.V., that she asked a work
colleague to come over and begin recording the rest of the call on her cell phone.
{¶4} On March 23, 2023, the appellant was indicted on two counts of Retaliation
Against a Public Servant in violation of R.C. 2921.05, felonies of the third degree; and,
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 3
two counts of Intimidation of a Public Servant in violation of R.C. 2921.03, also felonies
of the third degree. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the matter was
scheduled for a jury trial.
{¶5} The trial proceeded on January 16, 2024, at which S.V. testified that she
took the appellant’s comments as a direct and personal threat to herself and her co-
workers. S.V. also testified that this threat was noticeably different from prior threats the
appellant had made and, as such, she took it much more seriously. S.V. testified that the
appellant continued to make threatening statements, telling S.V. that “I’m going to burn
him (Magistrate T.I.) on the streets with people.” The appellant then stated ‘I’m sick of you
all ... we don’t have to take it.” She also told S.V. “Well, then I’m going to show you guys
what I’m going to do then.” At the end of the call, after other threatening comments, the
appellant stated “So now you guys are slamming me in a corner. Now you are going to
get slammed back. You remember that.” As a result of the appellant’s threats, the court
arranged for bailiffs to ensure that court staff were able to get safely to their vehicles in
the parking lot at the end of the day. S.V. testified that she perceived the appellant’s
statements as direct threats of harm.
{¶6} Magistrate T.I. also testified at trial, averring that there was a difference
between the threats the appellant had made previously and those made in the January,
2023 calls. He testified further that extra security was instituted as a result of the
appellant's threats. Although the appellant initially objected to the admission of evidence
regarding her prior threats, she ultimately withdrew the objection, stating that evidence of
the prior calls were part of the defense’s arguments.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 4
{¶7} The jury found the appellant guilty on the two Intimidation charges, and
acquitted her of the Retaliation charges. A sentencing hearing took place on February 13,
2024, at which the trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of incarceration
of 18 months on each charge. The trial court also imposed a two-year discretionary term
of Post Release Control (PRC), stating:
THE COURT: Even after completing the entire prison term which
the Court has now sentenced you to, you may be placed on post release
control supervision for a period of up to two years. During that time if you
violate any one or more of those terms, you could be sent back to serve up
to one-half of the original term of imprisonment. If you commit a new felony
while on post release control, you will have to serve that sentence
consecutively to any other term of imprisonment which results from violating
post release control, and the Court adopts that as part of it’s [sic] judgment
here today.
{¶8} In addition, on February 15, 2024, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry
on Sentence in which it set forth, inter alia, that the appellant had been advised at her
sentencing hearing of the possibility that upon her release from prison PRC may be
imposed for a period of two years, as well as the consequences for violating the terms of
PRC.
{¶9} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in which she sets fort the
following three assignments of error:
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 5
{¶10} “I. TRIPLETT’S CONVICTIONS FOR INTIMIDATION ARE AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.”
{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE STATE TO INTRODUCE IRRELEVANT PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
REGARDING PREVIOUS THREATS TRIPLETT ALLEDGEDLY [SIC] MADE TO THE
CLERK’S STAFF.”
{¶12} “III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IMPOSE PRC.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
{¶13} The appellant argues in her first assignment of error that her convictions on
the charges of intimidation were based upon insufficient evidence and were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Standard Of Review
{¶14} Sufficiency of the evidence was addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207:
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,
102,
684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia,
443
U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “ ‘Proof beyond a
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 6
reasonable doubt’ is proof of such character that an ordinary person would
be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person's own
affairs.” R.C. 2901.05(E). A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asks
whether the evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-
4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 219.
Id. at ¶57. Thus, a review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal
conviction requires a court of appeals to determine whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶15} Manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, addresses the
evidence's effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387
(1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v.
Smith, 1997–Ohio–355. The Court stated:
Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the
issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the
evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible
evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight
is not a question of mathematics but depends on its effect in inducing belief.”
(Emphasis added.) Black's, supra, at 1594.
Id. at 387. The Court stated further:
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 7
When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the
basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate
court sits as a “ ‘thirteenth juror’ ” and disagrees with the factfinder's
resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102 S.Ct. at
2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219,
485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 (“The court,
reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should
be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.”).
Id.
{¶16} In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
“… [I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the
finding of facts. …
“If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with
the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
judgment.”
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 8
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio
Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603 (1984).
Analysis
{¶17} The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of intimidation. R.C.
2921.03 addresses intimidation, and states in pertinent part:
(A) No person, knowingly and by force, by unlawful threat of harm to any
person or property, or by filing, recording, or otherwise using a materially
false or fraudulent writing with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton
or reckless manner, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public
servant, a party official, or an attorney or witness involved in a civil action or
proceeding in the discharge of the person’s the duties of the public servant,
party official, attorney, or witness.
{¶18} In order to prevail at trial on the charge of intimidation, the appellee was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant: 1) knowingly, 2) by
unlawful threat of harm, 3) attempted, 4) to influence, intimidate or hinder, 5) the officers
in the discharge of their duties. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when
he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶19} This court addressed the crime of intimidation in State v. Hamilton, 2014-
Ohio-3171 (5th Dist.). In Hamilton, the defendant told a Richland County Sheriff’s
lieutenant that “if he got any charges out of this [possessing the cellular telephone] that
he was going to make my life a living hell.” Id. at ¶37. The defendant argued that the
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 9
lieutenant’s testimony was not sufficient to establish intimidation because he was not able
to carry out his threat. This court stated:
“Notably, R.C. 2921.03(A) requires only an ‘attempt’ to influence,
intimidate, or hinder; it is not necessary to establish that the officer was
actually prevented from doing a particular task.” State v. Myers, 3rd Dist.
Henry No. 7–99–05, 2000–Ohio–1677, *1. Lieutenant Young testified he
took the words to be a threat. T. at 214, 247–249. Lieutenant Young's wife
is a sergeant and also works at the jail. T. at 230. We find appellant's
statement to be sufficient to establish a threat against Lieutenant Young and
the elements of intimidation.
Id.
{¶20} In this case, the appellant knowingly made comments to and about the
Magistrate and the court clerks that were threatening, stating that, among other things,
“I’m going to burn him (Magistrate T.I.) on the streets with people,” that “you guys need
to watch your backs when you go out in that back parking lot after work because anyone
can sit out there and watch for you,” and that “so now you guys are slamming me in a
corner. Now you are going to get slammed back. You remember that.” The witnesses
further testified that they took the appellant’s comments as threats, they were in fear for
their safety, and that the trial court arranged for bailiffs to ensure that court personnel
were able to get safely to their vehicles at the end of the day. We thus find that, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the essential
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 10
elements of intimidation. Furthermore, the jury’s verdict on the charge of intimidation is
supported by sufficient evidence, and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶21} The appellant’s convictions on the charges of intimidation were supported
by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, the appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
{¶22} The appellant argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court
abused its discretion when it allowed the appellee to introduce evidence of prior threats
she made to the Clerk’s staff. We disagree.
Standard Of Review
{¶23} The appellant withdrew her objection to admission of the above-referenced
evidence during trial and, as such, we review this issue for plain error. In order to establish
plain error, an appellant must show that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain or
obvious, (3) absent the error the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise,
and (4) reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Estep,
2024-Ohio-58, ¶ 63 (4th Dist.).
{¶24} The decision regarding whether to admit evidence at trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court:
“Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining
the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such
discretion is exercised in line with the rule of procedure and evidence.”
Rigby v. Lake Cty, 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991). The appellate court must
limit its review of the trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence to
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 11
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. The abuse of discretion
standard is more than an error of judgment; it implies the court ruled
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217 (1983).
State v. Edwards,
2021-Ohio-1917, (5th Dist.), ¶34. In the case sub judice, evidence of
the appellant’s prior communications with the Clerk’s office was admitted to show that her
prior comments were not concerning to court staff, but that her comments of January 27
and 31, 2023, were different in tone and as such created fear in the Magistrate and Clerks
– so much so that the court arranged for bailiffs to ensure that court staff were able to get
safely to their vehicles in the parking lot at the end of the day. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting this evidence. Furthermore, the appellant withdrew her objection
to the admission of said evidence, stating that “[i]n light of the fact that as part of the
defense case there were questions relating to things that the [appellant] had said in the
past as well, we would withdraw that objection.”
{¶25} Because the appellant withdrew her objection to evidence of her prior
comments to the court staff, she waived any potential error regarding its admission.
Moreover, the admission of said evidence did not result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice, and as such does not constitute plain error. Accordingly, the appellant’s second
assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III
{¶26} The appellant argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court
failed to properly impose PRC. We disagree.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 12
Standard Of Review
{¶27} Felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G). State v. Goings,
2014-Ohio-2322, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or vacate and
remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the record does not
support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13,
division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the
Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise contrary to
law.” State v. Yeager,
2016-Ohio-4759, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
Analysis
{¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the imposition of PCR in State v.
Bates, 2022-Ohio-475:
It is established that “a trial court has a statutory duty to provide
notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing.” State v. Jordan,
104 Ohio St.3d 21,
2004-Ohio-6085,
817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23, overruled on
other grounds by Harper. The trial court must advise the offender at the
sentencing hearing of the term of supervision, whether postrelease control
is discretionary or mandatory, and the consequences of violating
postrelease control. See Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19,
2017-Ohio-2927,
85
N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 11.
{¶29} The record establishes that the trial court properly advised the appellant at
the sentencing hearing of the term of PRC supervision, whether her post-release control
was discretionary or mandatory, and the consequences of violating post-release control,
stating: “… you may be placed on post release control supervision for a period of up to
Fairfield County, Case No. 2024 CA 00006 13
two years. During that time if you violate any one or more of those terms, you could be
sent back to serve up to one-half of the original term if imprisonment. If you commit a new
felony while on post release control, you will have to serve that sentence consecutively
to any other term of imprisonment which results from violating post release control….”
Furthermore, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry on Sentence that outlined the
imposition of PRC, which included its terms and consequences for violations thereof. The
trial court properly advised the appellant of PRC and, as such, her third assignment of
error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
{¶30} Based upon the foregoing, the appellant’s assignments of error numbers I,
II, and III are overruled, and the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas
is hereby affirmed.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Wise, John, J. concur.
