Viner v. Untrecht’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 187 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 195 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘It is fundamental that where a judgment is attacked on the ground that it is not supported, the power of the appellate court ends when it shall once have determined that there is substantial evidence which will support the conclusions of the trial court.’ (See Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808 [ 141 P.2d 732 ]; Watson v. Poore, 18 Cal.2d 302 [ 115 P.2d 478 ].) And that rule is applicable where the action is one to enforce a resulting trust. Whether the evidence to prove the existence of the trust is clear, satisfactory and convincing ‘is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal. ’ (Stromerson v. Averill, supra, at p. 815 . See also Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24 Cal.2d 1 [ 147 P.2d 583 ].) Likewise, in such cases the credibility and weight of the evidence are exclusively for the trial court.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Edwards v. Edwards · Gonzalez v. Riis

2. ““In the ordinary case a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor of the purchase price of the property where the purchase price is paid by one person and the title is taken in the name of another (Civ. Code, § 853; 25 Cal.Jur. 178). It is not always necessary that the payment of the purchase price be made by the claimant of the beneficial interest. It may be made by the transferee when it constitutes a loan from the transferee to the claimant. (Citing eases). Nor is a resulting trust prevented by an assumption by the transferee of an obligation to the vendor or transferor to pay the purchase price, where the claimant is obligated to reimburse the transferee. In such a case there is a loan of credit by the transferee to the claimant (citing authorities). . . . Contrary to defendant’s contention it is not necessary that there be an express agreement by the claimant to repay the loan. An agreement to repay may be implied (citing cases). Of course, the trustee of the resulting trust holds the legal title as security for the loan (citation). . . . Where the elements of a resulting trust are present, the fact that transferee and payor of the purchase price, and the claimant, made an oral agreement that the former was to hold the property in trust for the latter which was unenforceable under the statute of frauds or otherwise, does not prevent a resulting trust from arising. Indeed, such agreement supports the inference or presumption that the payor did not intend that the trans”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sherman v. Panno

3. “and therefore not recoverable in an action for the conversion of personal property where the statute (Civ. Code, 3336) provided that the detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. LeFave v. Dimond