26 Cal. 3d 131 - Jess v. Herrmann’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 34 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently April 2017 · most notably 19 Cal. 4th 66 - Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998), 19 Cal. 4th 332 - Mercury Insurance Group v. Superior Court (1998)
4 federal appellate · 34 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 13 Cal. 3d 804 - Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. · 20 Cal. 3d 578 - American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court · Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co. · 20 Cal. 3d 725 - Daly v. General Motors Corp. · 280 So. 2d 431 - Hoffman v. Jones
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Although the insurer in Stuyvesant, like the numerous amici in the instant case, argued that its obligation under its insurance policy should be viewed only as an obligation to pay sums owed by its insured after the setoff of any debts which the injured party owed its insured, the Florida court emphatically rejected that suggestion. The court recognized that in securing insurance coverage an insured does not thereby authorize its insurance company to reduce its own liability by, in effect, appropriating to its own benefit a separate asset of the insured, i.e., the insured's right to recover for his own injuries. * * * * * * At least in cases in which both parties to a lawsuit carry adequate insurance to cover the damages found to be payable to an injured party, both the public policy of California's financial responsibility law and considerations of fairness clearly support a rule barring a setoff of one party's recovery against the other. * * * * * * Under these circumstances, we conclude that the current setoff statutes cannot properly be interpreted to require setoff in cases in which such a setoff will defeat the principal purpose of California's financial responsibility law and will provide an inequitable windfall to an insurance carrier at the expense of the carrier's insured.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Nothing in Hoffman [ v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973)] the insurance laws, or the public policy of this state justifies our reading into a standard automobile liability insurance contract a requirement that a partially-negligent but fully-insured person should absorb a portion of the cost of his negligence. The purpose of the contract is precisely to the contrary, being designed and paid for to relieve the insured of all such obligations (within policy limits and over agreed deductibles, of course). Id. at 474 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Where cross-demands for money have existed between persons at any point in time when neither demand was barred by the statute of limitations, and an action is thereafter commenced by one such person, the other person may assert in his answer the defense of payment in that the two demands are compensated so far as they equal each other, notwithstanding that an independent action asserting his claim would at the time of filing his answer be barred by the statute of limitations.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.