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← 26 F.3d 1001 - United States v. Greenspan

United States v. Greenspan’s Empirical Analysis

26 F.3d 1001 · 1994

Citation profile

72
cited by 72 later decisions
9
states following
February 2024
most recently cited

28 federal appellate · 7 district · 10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 72 later decisions — most recently February 2024 · most notably United States v. Yousef (2003), United States v. Yu-Leung (1995)

28 federal appellate · 7 district · 10 state decisions

3001994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 144 · 28 U.S.C. § 455

Relies on Liteky et al United States · Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. · Brewster v. Derwinski · New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp. · United States v. Guzman

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[h]ad there been any reason to believe that threats were made only in an attempt to obtain a different judge, to delay the proceedings, to harass, or for other vexatious or frivolous purpose, recusal would not have been warranted, even if the judge learned of the threats from a third person such as a federal agent.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “'whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"[U]nder these unique circumstances, the trial judge should have recused himself from sentencing Greenspan. The judge learned of the alleged threat from the FBI, and there is nothing in the record to suggest the threat was a ruse by the defendant in an effort to obtain a different judge. . . . ". . .The trial court had accelerated the date of Greenspan's sentencing, for the stated reason that the court wanted to get Greenspan into the penitentiary system as quickly as possible, and the trial court refused to grant a continuance of the sentencing hearing even though defendant's counsel had been appointed only two days before the sentencing date. Although any one of these actions standing alone would not provide sufficient reason to believe a judge was biased against the defendant, when considered in light of the judge's knowledge of the alleged threats against him, these factors might provide further bases for questioning the court's impartiality."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.