Killam v. Schoeps’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ There might as well be included in one agreement a contract for the lease of real estate, or for the hiring of chattels, or the performance of labor, with an absolute promise to pay a sum certain at a certain time, and then affirm that by reason of this absolute promise the entire contract is a negotiable instrument. This is not the law. Doubtless many of the rules respecting negotiable paper are purely arbitrary, but nevertheless they are well settled, and' ought to be rigorously enforced. Among those rules is that of the unity of the contract, the singleness of the promise to pay, and we think no departure should be made from the spirit or letter of those rules. We conclude, then, that whenever any stipulation concerning other matters than the payment of money is incorporated in one instrument with a promise to pay money, such double contract will not be adjudged a negotiable paper.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman · International Harvester Co. of America v. Watkins

2. ““It is essential to the negotiability of paper that there is in it but the single promise to pay money. You may not incorporate with such a promise stipu lations and agreements as to other matters, and then say that the absolute promise to pay money lifts the contract into the region of negotiable paper. This is the general rule, and whatever exceptions there may be, this is not one. In 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 59, the rule is thus stated: ‘In the sixth place, it is essential to the negotiability of the bill or note, that it purport to be only for the payment of money. Sudi at least may be stated to be the general rule, for if any other agreement of a different character be engrafted upon it, it becomes a special contract, clogged and involved with other matters, and has been deemed to lose thereby its character as a commercial instrument.’ Now this instrument touches other matters, and contains other stipulations and provisions than those respecting the payment of money. It is a contract in respect to the title to property. It is also a contract for the possession of property, and because of these additional stipulations it is something more than a simple promise'to pay money.” (p. 312.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rohr v. Jeffery