26 Tenn. App. 641 - Hicks v. Hicks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We think an emergency here must be held to mean facts and conditions which have emerged since the decree, new facts and changed conditions which were not determined and could not be anticipated by the decree; and that the decree is final and conclusive upon all the facts and conditions which existed and upon which the decree was made.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. Haase · In Re Ejm

2. “effect ... as res judicata is not confined in its operation to subsequent independent proceedings, but also applies to all collateral proceedings in the same action.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Utterback v. Starkey · 224 Wis. 2d 288 - Precision Erecting, Inc. v. M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, G.A.P., Inc.

3. ““But the decrees in those cases were not final in the sense that they precluded a later decree upon new facts or changed conditions making a change of custody necessary for the welfare of the child. In the Kenner case [Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211 , 201 S. W. 779 , L. R. A. 1918E, 587] it was said that the power to make such a change remained in the court that had decreed the divorce and custody, ‘such power being held essentially in reserve by all courts in such cases.’ 139 Tenn. 222 -224, 201 S. W. 782 , L. R. A. 1918E, 587. See, also, 27 C. J. S., Divorce, Sec. 317. “That decision was before the enactment of 1932 Code section 8454, by which decrees for support and custody remain in the control of the court and are ‘subject to such changes or modification as the exigencies of the case may require.’ That section seems merely declaratory of pre-existing law, so far as decrees for custody are concerned. That section and the provision of section 8446, retaining within the court’s control decrees for support or maintenance and empowering the court, on application of either party, to ‘decree an increase or decrease of such allowance on cause being shown,’ were enacted, it would seem, primarily to remove the. difficulty that had been encountered with respect to future installments of alimony in cases where a divorce a vinculo had been granted. Such a decree was final, passed beyond the court’s control after thirty days, and could thereafter neither be modified nor enforced by p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 30 Tenn. App. 487 - Cravens v. Cravens