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← 260 F.3d 531 - Campbell v. Coyle

Campbell v. Coyle’s Empirical Analysis

260 F.3d 531 · 2001

Citation profile

102
cited by 102 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
March 2025
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 102 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2025 · most notably Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr. v. Phillip Parker, Warden (2003), Bugh v. Mitchell (2003)

50 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

660200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Williams v. Taylor · Kyles v. Whitley · Sandstrom v. Montana

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 102 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]he cases where this court has granted the writ for failure of counsel to investigate potential mitigating evidence have been limited to those situations in which defense counsel have totally failed to conduct such an investigation. In contrast, if a habeas claim does not involve a failure to investigate but, rather, petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the degree of his attorney’s investigation, the presumption of reasonableness imposed by Strickland will be hard to overcome.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We also note that, unlike in Seidel [v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750 , 752 (9th Cir.1998) ] and Glenn [v. Tate, 11 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir.1995) ] ..., Campbell has not pointed to anything in his childhood medical records indicating that he has either PTSD or some form of brain damage. He has never been diagnosed or treated for PTSD, whereas the medical records in Seidel explicitly noted the defendant’s mental afflictions. See Seidel, 146 F.3d at 755-56 . At most, Campbell’s childhood medical records would have provided another list of people to interview. These former physicians and healthcare workers, Campbell argues, would have been able to expose his mental condition. This is much too tenuous a claim to support the conclusion that Campbell was prejudiced by his attorneys’ failure to look into his childhood medical records.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.