260 N.J. Super. 322 - Febus v. Barot’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he sufficiency of disclosure under the prudent patient standard requires that the disclosure be viewed through the mind of the patient, not the physician. Implicit in this shift of emphasis is the recognition that expert testimony is no longer required in order to establish the medical community’s standard for disclosure and whether a physician failed to meet that standard. In our view, however, the prudent patient standard does not always dispense entirely with the need for expert medical testimony in an informed consent case. Although, under this doctrine, no medical expert is required to prove that an undisclosed risk would have been material to the patient’s consent, it must first be shown that the risk was one of which the physician should have been aware, and that it was recognized within the medical community. [ Febus, supra, 260 N.J.Super. at 327 , 616 A.2d 933 (emphasis added) ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 271 N.J. Super. 513 - Adamski v. Moss · 306 N.J. Super. 423 - Tyndall v. Zaboski

2. “A risk would be deemed “material” when a reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be “likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks” in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to submit to it. [ Largey, supra, 110 N.J. at 211-12 , 540 A.2d 504 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972)).]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Frost v. Brenner · 271 N.J. Super. 513 - Adamski v. Moss

3. “... Largey only shifted the focus of inquiry in determining the materiality of a risk from the doctor’s perspective to that of the patient’s. It did not alter the rale of Calabrese [Calabrese v. Trenton State College, 162 N.J.Super. 145 , 392 A.2d 600 (App.Div.1978) aff'd, 82 N.J. 321 , 413 A.2d 315 (1980)] that proof of a risk recognized by the professional community must come from a qualified expert. [Id. at 328,616 A.2d 933 ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 306 N.J. Super. 423 - Tyndall v. Zaboski