260 So. 2d 425 - Wolf v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hat constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and the narcotic property to complete the concept of "possession" is a question which is not susceptible to a specific rule. However, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.... Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject to [the defendant's] dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Arnett v. State · Hudson v. State

2. “" On the probable cause question, the standards applicable to a search of an automobile without a warrant are substantially the same as those required for a search warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 , 91 S.Ct. 1031 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). " Aguilar [ Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)] laid down the two-pronged test applicable to the factual basis supporting a magistrate's assessment of probable cause for a search warrant, and that test applies with respect to an officer's assessment of probable cause for a warrantless search. As already stated, the defendant in this case concedes that the informer involved here was reliable under the Aguilar test. It remains to be determined whether the evidence offered on the motion to suppress was sufficient to meet the Aguilar basis-of-knowledge test [as] applied and expounded on in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In the later case of United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 91 S.Ct. 2075 , 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971), the Court again considered the requirements of the underlying factual basis necessary for the issuance of a search warrant, and enunciated the court's commonsense and nontechnical approach in reviewing probable cause questions by quoting from United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), as follows: "[ T ] he Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thomas v. State · 327 So. 2d 255 - Joyce v. State

3. “"The second reliability test is an attempt to guard against tips provided by untruthful or unreliable informers, and suggests that an informer is credible if he has provided truthful tips in the past. Moreover, the information may be deemed reliable if corroborated by independent investigation. Both tests require only that some of the underlying circumstances be sworn to. Furthermore, in Spinelli , the Court indicated that the basis-of-knowledge test could be fulfilled without a statement of the circumstances from which the informer derived his information; i.e., if a tip is sufficiently detailed, it may be self-verifying, and one may conclude that the informer was not relying on mere rumor. In the instant case, the tip, because of its great detail and corroboration, was self-verifying, and in addition, there was independent corroboration by the New Orleans officers." (Emphasis added). 231 So.2d at 783 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 327 So. 2d 255 - Joyce v. State