Brumbach v. Day’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It was clearly the duty of Mr. Day, before re-entering the highway, to look to the east for approaching vehicles and not to proceed into the highway if he saw one coming, unless he could re-enter the highway in safety. KRS 189.330(6). (Now KRS 189.330(7).) Of course, Mr. Day was not required to exercise an infallible judgment, but was required to use such care as a reasonably cautious and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. “However, Mr. Day does not claim that he saw the approach of Brumbach’s car from the west, nor that he believed that he had time to safely re-enter the highway, but claims he looked and saw no vehicle approaching on the highway. Either Mr. Day did not look for approaching vehicles on the highway or failed to see Brumbach’s car, which must have been very close and in plain sight. In either event Day was negligent. “In Vaughn v. Jones, Ky., 1953, 257 S.W.2d 583 , it was said: “ ‘Thus, it appears that Jones moved out into the’ highway after looking in the direction from which Vaughn was coming when it was “approaching so closely on the highway as to constitute an hazard.” KRS 189.330(4). It was not sufficient that he should have stopped, but have yielded the right-of-way by not proceeding into the highway. KRS 189.-330(4) Vaughn could assume, under the circumstances, that Jones would conform to the law and remain where he was until the way was reasonably clear and could act upon that assumption in determining his own manner of using the ro”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor