Lott v. Coyle’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

70 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 136 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Millender v. Adams · Smith v. Stegall

2. “(A) the claim relies on— (1) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Alley v. Bell · Vroman v. Brigano

3. “Lott cannot demonstrate cause for his procedural default, because he cannot establish the requisite cause for his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. At the time that Lott filed his Murnahan motion on June 30, 1993, it was unclear whether, under Ohio law, a defendant’s strict compliance with § 2945.05 was required to execute a valid waiver, or whether substantial compliance was sufficient. Compare State v. Harris, 73 Ohio App.3d 57 , 596 N.E.2d 563 , 568 (1991) (holding that strict compliance with § 2945.05 is required to execute a valid waiver) with State v. Morris, 8 Ohio App.3d 12 , 455 N.E.2d 1352 , 1355 (1982) (suggesting that substantial compliance is satisfactory, provided that § 2945.05 is satisfied “by a writing signed by the defendant himself and filed with the court”) with Marysville v. Foreman, 78 Ohio App.3d 118 , 603 N.E.2d 1155 , 1158 (1992) (noting that “[w]here there is a written waiver filed with the court after arraignment and opportunity to consult with counsel, there has been a substantial compliance with the' applicable rules and statutes and there is no error”). Thus, we cannot conclude that Lott’s counsel should have reasonably anticipated in 1993 the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Pless, which finally resolved the issue and required strict compliance with each requirement of § 2945.05 for execution of a valid jury waiver.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Haliym v. Mitchell