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261 Ga. 286

404 S.E.2d 120

Harper v. Smith

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided May 15, 1991

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1991-05-15

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently February 2004

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“A trial court has no authority, in a contempt proceeding, to modify a final judgment and divorce decree. [Cit.] [The trial court’s order in the instant case] was a modification of the final judgment and decree and must be reversed.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Wagan v. Wagan

Relies on Sells v. Eilender

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1991-05-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Smith, Presiding Justice.

¶1 The parties were divorced on September 22, 1989 and on January 25, 1990 the appellant, Mrs. Harper, filed a contempt action against the appellee, Mr. Smith. The appellee answered and counterclaimed seeking to have portions of the original divorce decree vacated. The trial court vacated a part of the decree. We granted the appellant’s application for discretionary appeal and requested the parties to address the issue of whether the trial court erred “by striking the promissory-note requirement from the divorce decree.” We hold that the trial court did err, and we reverse.

¶2 A trial court has no authority, in a contempt proceeding, to modify a final judgment and divorce decree. Sells v. Eilender, 251 Ga. 463 (306 SE2d 662) (1983). That portion of the trial court order that vacated the promissory-note requirement was a modification of the final judgment and decree and must be reversed. The remaining portions of the contempt order are unaffected.

¶3 Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur. *287 Decided May 15, 1991 — Reconsideration denied June 7, 1991. Shelby A. Outlaw, for appellant. Wallace & Moss, Howard P. Wallace, for appellee.
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