Boles v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Thus, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime. # u * # * # "Whether he [defendant] realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor his attorney desired. Confronted with the choice between a trial for first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other, Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to a 80-year term. * *# * L # * "In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ross v. State

2. “We agree with the rationale herein-above quoted, but we do not imply that Indiana courts should depart from close judicial serutiny of guilty pleas. A guilty plea amounts to an admission of the crime charged. Batchelor v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 69 , 125 N.E. 773 . Therefore, where a guilty plea is accompanied with a protestation of innocence and unaccompanied by evidence showing a factual basis for guilt, the trial court should never accept it. But where, as in the case at bar, the plea is accompanied with overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the defendant is judicially advised of all the rights he is waiving, and the plea is voluntarily, freely, and knowingly given, then the subjective motivation behind such plea shall not render it defective. Subsequent contentions of innocence arising during post-conviction relief proceedings are not sufficient, nothing more appearing, to attack a previously entered plea of guilty.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ross v. State

3. ““Furthermore, the voluntariness of a guilty plea is not rendered constitutionally defective merely because a criminal defendant denies commission of the crime North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 . The factors which motivated the appellant to plead guilty are not material, so long as we can ascertain from the record that his guilty plea was entered freely, voluntarily and knowingly. Brady v. United States, supra: Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 .” 1 Boles v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 354 , 303 N.E.2d 645 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 163 Ind. App. 132 - Brown v. State