State v. Southard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"(1) If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall not be brought to trial within ninety (90) days after such person's arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (3). . . . . "(3) The time for trial may be extended beyond the limitations of subsections (1) and (2) of this section for any of the following reasons: (a) The defendant is incompetent to stand trial; (b) A proceeding to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial is pending and a determination thereof may not be completed within the time limitations fixed for trial by this section; (c) There is material evidence which is unavailable; that reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence; and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence can be obtained and trial commenced within the next succeeding 90 days. Not more than one continuance may be granted the state on this ground, unless for good cause shown, where the original continuance was for less than 90 days, and the trial is commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days from the original trial date; (d) Because of other cases pending for trial, the court does not have sufficient time to commence the trial of the case within the time fixed for trial by ”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Bloom · State v. White

2. ““Southard contends drat under Downing, tíme attributable to a defendant from defense motions is restricted to actual delay resulting from their pendency as distinguished from time elapsing while tirey are pending. We do not agree. Our effort in Downing was to apply a reasonableness requirement to ease the tension between the theory of die statute and the methods used by district courts to handle crowded dockets, and to measure delay by a standard of reasonableness where actual delay cannot be precisely determined. Thus, the K.S.A. 22-3402 phrase ‘unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant’ was construed to include reasonable time for the parties to brief issues and for the court to decide them as part of the delay resulting from defendant’s filing a motion.” (Emphasis added.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 34 Kan. App. 2d 746 - State v. Brown · 46 Kan. App. 2d 1074 - State v. Butts

3. ““A continuance is properly charged to the defendant if it is either the result of the application of the defendant or if it is the result of the fault of the defendant. [Citation omitted.] A defendant, by his or her conduct, may waive the statutory right to a speedy trial. Such conduct includes requesting or even acquiescing in the grant of a continuance. Defense counsel’s actions are attributable to defendant in computing speedy trial violations.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Southard, 261 Kan. 744, 748 , 933 P.2d 730 (1997).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Brown