Smith v. Ussery’s Empirical Analysis
1972
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently March 2000 · most notably 287 So. 2d 56 - Conklin v. Cohen (1973), 468 So. 2d 417 - Cadillac Fairview of Florida, Inc. v. Cespedes (1985)
2 federal appellate · 22 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 72 So. 2d 285 - Jones v. Florida Power Corp. · Younger v. Giller Contracting Co., Inc. · Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt · State v. Luckie · Pimental v. John E. Cox Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Nor can the Corporation be considered a ‘contractor,’ (and thus the ‘statutory’ employer of Burns’ and Grinnell’s employees) within the meaning of Section 440.10 ... since the clear implication in this part of the Act is that there must be a contractual obligation on the part of the contractor, a portion of which he sublets to another. To ‘sublet’ means to ‘underlet’ ... in the context in which it is here used, the effect of subletting is to pass on to another an obligation under a contract for which the person so ‘subletting’ is primarily obligated. The Corporation, under the facts here present, had no primary obligation under a contract which it was passing on to another. It was not then, a ‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Act.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The contention that the plaintiff is barred from pursuing this cause because her decedent and the operator of defendant's truck were both statutory employees of Hendry County Rock Company, thus limiting her to Workmen's Compensation benefits, is without merit. Hendry County Rock Company was not a `contractor' and the defendant was not a `subcontractor' as those terms are used in F.S. 440.10(1), F.S.A., so as to confine the plaintiff to Workmen's Compensation benefits as provided in F.S. 440.11, F.S.A. The mere fact that plaintiff's decedent and defendant's truck driver were working on the same general project does not make them employees of a common employer, and as Hendry County Rock Company had no primary obligation under a contract with another party, a portion of which it was passing on to defendant, it was not a `contractor' who would become the statutory employer of defendant's employees. * * * * * * * * * "Under the facts in this case the defendant was a `third party tortfeasor,' as that term is used in F.S. 440.39, against whom the plaintiff may bring these actions. * * *”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“It is undisputed * * * that all construction agreements were entered into between Hialeah Hospital * * * and the several contractors on the job. These agreements are those of an owner and independent contractors separately * * * rather than between a true contractor and `subs' which is necessary for workmen's compensation immunity under `common employer' in the initial cases cited. Under these circumstances there is no `common employer' and the necessary predicate is not present to invoke the workmen's compensation exclusive remedy which the trial court and district court allowed under Fla. Stat. § 440.10 (1). Accordingly, such independent contractors as these respondents become subject to a common law suit for negligence in these circumstances.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.