Nipper v. Brandon Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When a regular employee is driving a vehicle owned by the employer, and an accident occurs, there is a presumption of fact that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. It is a presumption of fact which imposes on the other party, against whom the presumption is directed, the burden of overcoming this presumption. Ark.Stats.Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 301 (Noncum.Supp., 1976). * * * * * * We feel it necessary to point out that some of the language in our previous cases describing this presumption of fact is not correct. It is not an “inference.” Healey v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327 , 202 S.W. 229 (1918). It is not an “inference or presumption of fact.” Curtis Circulation Co. v. Henderson, 232 Ark. 1029 , 342 S.W.2d 89 (1961). It is not a “temporary presumption.” Ford & Son Sanitary Co. v. Ransom, 213 Ark. 390 , 210 S.W.2d 508 (1948). It is not a “prima facie presumption.” Brooks v. Bale Chevrolet Co., Inc., 198 Ark. 17, 127 S.W.2d 135 (1939). In other words, we have called this presumption by different names, but the precise description is a presumption of fact as defined in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 301 (Non-cum.Supp., 1976).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Harris Transport Co.