Craig v. Driscoll’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 4 district · 100 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Our Supreme Court has recently reviewed the test for determining whether a complaint states a cause of action in recklessness: [The court must] look first to the definitions of willful, wanton and reckless behavior. Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... it is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. While [the court has] attempted to draw definitional distinctions between the terms willful, wanton or reckless, in practice the three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing. The result is that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ... It is at least clear ... that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention. Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312 , 813 ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Murphy v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 3028 - Doe v. Favreau, No. Cv02 39 30 19 S (Mar. 7, 2003)

2. ““The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor’s conduct. . . . The test of proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injury. The substantial factor test asks . . . whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 330-31 , 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). “The question of proximate causation generally belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 321 , 852 A.2d 703 (2004).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc. · 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 4061 - Aherne v. Lifeline Systems, Inc., No. Cv99 0269317-S (Mar. 21, 2003)

3. “I believe that the time has come for this court to recognize a common law cause of action, sounding in negligence, for the sale of intoxicating beverages to someone who, because of his intoxication, thereafter injures an innocent bystander on our public highways. Studies too numerous to replicate have demonstrated, time and time again, the strong eon- nection between excessive consumption of alcohol and violent traffic accidents, [citations omitted]. The hapless victim in this case was simply another statistic in a long line of similar victims, killed by a driver who, after the consumption of a great deal of liquor at a bar, crossed the median line on the highway and drove his car into oncoming traffic ...”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Drysdale ex rel. Drysdale v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · Sepega v. DeLaura Concurrence