¶1concurring specially.
¶2Though I agree with the majority opinion’s affirmance of appellant’s murder conviction and death sentence, I write separately to shed more light on the issue of challenges to venirepersons under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (88 SC 1770, 20 LE2d 776) *66(1968).
¶3Appellant contends the trial court erred in excusing one juror who had reservations as to his ability to impose the death penalty and in retaining another juror who expressed support for the death penalty. The majority opinion correctly states the rule as to how Wither-spoon and “reverse-Witherspoon” issues are to be handled. Majority opinion, Divisions 5 and 6. However, I write separately to focus attention on the need for trial courts to give as much attention to “reverseWitherspoon” challenges as that given to Witherspoonchallenges. In the case-in-chief, appellant contends there are some structural imbalances in the present approach which allow the trial court to weed-out jurors with qualms about the death penalty and weed-in jurors who were prone to impose the death penalty. While the majority opinion, with which I agree, finds that the trial court’s treatment of the matter was even-handed, we must continue to bring to the attention of trial courts the need to expend an equal amount of effort in rehabilitating jurors with qualms about imposing the death penalty as is expended in rehabilitating jurors who are death-prone.
¶4Both the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution guarantee the right to a jury made up of a cross-section of the community. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XL Therefore, trial courts, in carrying out their obligations under Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.1, should endeavor to include rather than exclude jurors who have responded to the call to serve. Under Witherspoon, as modified by Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (105 SC 844, 83 LE2d 841) (1985), considerable attention has been focused on the need to challenge for cause those veniremen who cannot abide by the oath and instructions and impose the death penalty when the circumstances warrant. Unfortunately, an equal amount of attention has not been given to the need to assure that the jury is not composed only of death-prone jurors. To have such a constituted jury would be fundamentally unfair.