Hester v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

151 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 151 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “". . .[W]e are not prepared to say that there can be no conviction of the collateral crime alleged in a charge of felony murder. Should the affidavit or indictment and the evidence warrant a conviction of such collateral offense, an instruction with respect thereto would be proper. But in the case before us, all of the evidence before the jury was that the defendant committed the acts of robbery and murder upon the deceased and that he was guilty as charged, unless he was in fact of unsound mind at the time thereof. For the trial court to have instructed the jury that it could find the defendant not guilty as charged but guilty of robbery, as a lesser included offense, would have been to suggest to them a compromise verdict. Although compromise verdicts doubtlessly are often forthcoming, they are not sanctioned in law and certainly should not be court induced.” See also, Whitten v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 407 , 333 N.E.2d 86 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State · Moncrief v. State

2. “"On or about the 7th day of September, 1981, in Huntington County, in the State of Indiana, Shawn Lynn Sills did knowingly or intentionally kill another human being, Mary Haines, by striking and beating at and against the body of the said Mary Haines with his fists and did then and there and thereby cause said Mary Haines to die. "All of which is contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, to-wit: Ind.Code 85-42-1-1 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Wright v. State · Sills v. State

3. “Looking to the procedural difficulty in administering bifurcated trials, the Arizona court noted that the trial court could not consider the evidence of insanity at the first trial and would thus be required to find intent solely from the circumstances connected with the offense. ‘ * * * The first trial then would involve only proof that an act of a criminal nature had been committed, and that the defendant committed it. In effect, this gives rise to a presumption of intent, premeditation, or malice which runs counter to the common law and constitutional concepts of criminal law. The second trial is limited solely to the question of legal insanity, the guilt of the defendant having already been determined. There is no provision, nor realistically could there be, to determine also intent, premeditation, or malice in reduction of the degree of the crime. Thus, the presumption raised in the first trial becomes an irrebuttable presumption. Such a presumption is in violation of due process, * * *.’ [State v. Shaw,] 106 Ariz. 103 , 471 P.2d [715,] 724 [ (1970) ]. We hold that although a plea of insanity may be viewed as an admission of the commission of the criminal act and may in other ways ease the State’s burden of proof, it does not, in the absence of other compelling circumstances, entitle a defendant to a bifurcated trial. We do not view the defendant’s alleged reason for requesting the two-stage trial as a circumstance giving rise to probable and substantial prejudice such a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Wisehart v. State