State v. Ninci’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 102 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ “Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or property to be seized.’ “Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides protection identical to that provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 356, 362 , 856 P.2d 134 (1993) (‘[T]he wording and scope of the two sections are identical for all practical purposes. If conduct is prohibited by one it is prohibited by the other.’); State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 824 , 850 P.2d 818 (1993).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Wonders · State v. Mendez

2. ““2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 274, states the rule as follows: ‘An extrajudicial statement is inadmissible as hearsay only when offered as evidence of die trudi of the matter to which it relates. If die statement is offered merely to show the fact of its having been made, it is admissible through the person who heard it. ... “6 Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.) § 1766, states: ‘. . . The essence of the Hearsay rule is the distinction between die testimonial (or assertive) use of human utterances and dieir nontestimonial use. The theory of die Hearsay rule . . . is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor becomes die basis of our inference, and dierefore the assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subject to die test of cross-examination. If, therefore, an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to evidence die matter asserted, but widiout reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply. . . .’ “And, see, 2 Jones on Evidence (6th Ed.) § 8.6 which gives the following explanation: ‘If a statement previously made out of court is offered in evidence through a witness . . . not for die purpose of establishing the truth of die matter stated, but merely for die purpose of establishing the fact that the statement was made, die evidence is admissible, if it is relevant, and it is not subject to the exclusionary impact of the hearsay rul”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Smith

3. “"The defendant has the burden of furnishing a record which affirmatively shows prejudicial error occurred in the trial, and absent such a record, the reviewing court assumes the trial court's action was proper. State v. Gonzales, 245 Kan. 691, 699 , 783 P.2d 1239 (1989). Ninci presented no evidence that the jury knew he was wearing a leg brace, or that the jury detected his slight limp, or that the jury knew his limp was caused by a leg brace, or that the jury knew the leg brace was on for restraint reasons instead of for medical reasons. Thus, the State asserts that this court should assume the trial court's action in allowing the use of the leg brace was proper and affirm the trial court's ruling. "The leg restraint in this case was so unobtrusive that it is not even clear the jury noticed it. Since the restraint was not inherently prejudicial, Ninci was required to come forward with some evidence indicating the jury at least noticed the leg brace or knew it was a restraint. "In this case, the trial court relied on the deputy's decision in allowing the use of the brace. It is the trial judge's ultimate responsibility to assure a fair trial to the accused. The trial court did make an independent analysis that the leg brace was unobtrusive. Thus, without specific evidence of prejudice, the court allowed the brace. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and its ruling on this issue is affirmed." 262 Kan. at 53-54 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Powell