¶1The appellant, Joseph Coxson, entered guilty pleas on July 23, 1975, to charges of indecent assault and corrupting the morals of a minor. He was sentenced on September 5,1975, and thereafter filed an appeal to the Superior Court.
¶2Appellant raises several claims, among them the argument that his guilty plea was not knowingly or intelligently made because he was never adequately advised of the essential elements of his right to a jury trial. After reviewing the record from the transcript of the guilty plea colloquy, we are constrained to find merit in this argument.
¶3*16During the course of the colloquy, the following excerpt is the only instruction by the court as to appellant’s right to choose trial by jury: “You have the right to a trial either by jury or before the judge without a jury at which time the judge would act as both judge and a jury, if you and the judge request and agree to such a trial.” While the appellant indicated his full understanding of this explanation, the pronouncements by our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), make it clear that the explanation of jury rights was deficient in this case. In Williams, the court held that the trial court, when accepting a guilty plea, must be assured that the criminal defendant knows that the 12 jurors would be chosen from members of the community, that the accused would be permitted to participate in the selection of the jury panel, and that the jury verdict would have to be unanimous. If these factors are not explained to the accused during the guilty plea colloquy, the court cannot be assured that the waiver of a right to jury trial was knowingly or intelligently made. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra; Commonwealth v. Hooks, 450 Pa. 562, 301 A.2d 827 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 450 Pa. 167, 299 A.2d 272 (1973). Under the facts here present, the appellant’s guilty plea cannot stand.
¶4Judgment of sentence is reversed and a new trial is granted.
¶5. At Superior Court No. 109 April Term, 1976.
¶6. The author of this Opinion was noted as dissenting to that earlier order.