¶1On Rehearing.
¶2On further consideration of the matters treated on original submission, Justice Lawson joins with Chief Justice Livingston in concurring with the views expressed by Justice Simpson on original submission. Justice Mayfield concurs in the conclusion reached by Justice Simpson, but his views are stated in a concurring opinion which will be hereafter set out. It results, therefore, that the majority of the court now hold that the judgment of the trial court should not be reversed for the sole reason assigned in the court’s opinion written on original submission. It follows, therefore, that other questions which were asserted by counsel for appellant as constituting reversible error but which were not treated on original submission must now be considered. These are assignments of error 1, 2 and 3. They are:
“1. The trial court erred in overruling the appellants’ motion for new trial.
“2. The trial court erred in refusing to give to the jury the following instruction requested by the appellants in writing:
“ T. The court charges the jury that if you believe the evidence in this case you must find for the defendants.’
“3. The trial court erred in overruling the appellants’ objection to the qualification of the venire of jurymen at the appellee’s request as to whether or not any juror was an officer, agent or employee of the General Accident Insurance Corporation to which ruling of the court the appellants duly reserved an exception.”
¶3We treat them in chronological and reverse order.
¶4Assignment No. 3. Appellants concede that it has been proper in the past for the jury panel to be asked whether or not any juror was an officer, agent or employee of a named insurance company, but insist that since January 1, 1952, the effective date of the Motor Vehicle Safety Re*418sponsibility Act, Title 36, § 74(42) et seq., Pocket Part, Code of 1940, such action is improper because of § 74(52), Title 36, Code of 1940, Pocket Part, of said act which provides:
“Neither the report required by section 74(45), the action taken by the director pursuant to this subdivision, the findings, if any, of the director upon which such action is based, nor the security filed as provided in this article shall be referred to in any way, nor be any evidence of the negligence or due care of either party, at the trial of any action at law to recover damages.”
¶5We cannot agree with this contention. There is no conflict in the section quoted above and Title 30, § 52, Code of 1940, and the rule of our cases holding that “ ‘ “the plaintiff is entitled, upon his seasonable and proper motion, to have the jurors from whom the trial jury is to be selected qualified as to their relation to, or interest in, any insurance company which would be liable, in whole or in part, for any judgment that might be rendered against the defendant.” ’ ” Fortson v. Hester, 252 Ala. 143, 39 So.2d 649, 651; Cox v. Bennett, 250 Ala. 698, 36 So.2d 86.
¶6Assignment No. 2. The insistence that defendants were entitled to the affirmative charge with hypothesis is based on the contention that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because he allegedly violated § 12(b), Title 36 of the code in that he did not give audible warning with his horn or other warning device before attempting to pass defendant’s truck while proceeding in the same direction.
¶7The collision occurred on Highway 169 between Opelika and Crawford around 2:30 in the afternoon. The weather was fair. The plaintiff was driving his own automobile and was accompanied by his service manager, Exton Black. The truck, which belonged to defendant Prince, was being driven by his foreman, defendant Slianeyfelt,-who was accompanied by Henry Stevens and Eunice Edwards, two negro men. Both' vehicles were traveling south, the truck in front of plaintiff’s automobile. The truck was -partially loaded with sawmill slabs which were to be thrown off at Edward’s home. The highway was on rolling terrain. The plaintiff topped a hill going 50 to 55 miles an hour when the truck was about halfway down the hill. He followed the truck 75 or 80 yards until he could see around the curve or far enough to be safe, and “then I pulled out to pass him, and there was no signal given … and as I got, well even with his almost front fender, without any warning, no signal, he cuts to the left at a side road there that led into his house I suppose.” This road that the truck was turning to the left to enter was a private drive leading to Edward’s house. The front left fender of the truck locked with the right front wheel of the automobile and the automobile turned over to the left, and plaintiff and Black were thrown clear of it. Defendant Shaneyfelt testified:
“Well, when I got about even with Rollo’s house why I looked in my rear view mirror and I saw a car coming over the hill, but I thought it was plenty far énough behind me that I would-n’t have any trouble, but I give a left-hand turn signal and helt my hand way out so he could have seen it if he had been looking for it, and I helt my hand out until I had to take it off and put it on the wheel. … I slowed down but I don’t ever drive very fast. … * Well, I couldn’t have been going over five miles a hour you know, making a square turn to the left, but I had slowed down until I was running I imagine something like ten or twelve just before I got to the turn-off, made the turn.”
¶8Pie further testified that he put both hands on the wheel and made the turn to the left of the pavement where the impact occurred. When he last looked back, plaintiff’s car was in the right lane and Shaneyfelt did not know plaintiff was trying to pass. The horn was not sounded from the rear but it blew as the vehicles collided. Plaintiff and Black testified that they could not definitely say whether or not plaintiff sounded his horn. Stevens, the middle *419man on the seat of the truck was a witness for plaintiff. He, Shaneyfelt and Edwards all testified the horn blew at or near the time of impact. Irrespective of the exact time the horn on plaintiff’s automobile was sounded, we think a jury question was presented under the rule of Triplett v. Daniel, 255 Ala. 566, 52 So.2d 184, 186, where it was said:
“ … If under the undisputed proof in the case there is a violation of § 17, Title 36, Code of 1940, then such violation constitutes negligence on the part of the plaintiff as a matter of law but it would still remain a question for the jury as to whether violation of the statute proximately contributed to her injury. Newman v. Lee, 222 Ala. 499, 133 So. 10; Newell Contracting Co. v. Berry, 223 Ala. 109, 134 So. 870.
“The case of Alabama Power Co. v. Buck, 250 Ala. 618, 35 So.2d 355, is not contrary to the principle here stated. In that case there was testimony tending to show that both the plaintiff and the defendant had violated statutory rules of the road. In that case it was a question for the jury as to whether the plaintiff’s violation of the statute proximately contributed to his injuries or whether the defendant’s violation •of either one or both of two other statutes was the proximate cause of the accident.
“Holman v. Brady, 241 Ala. 487, 3 So.2d 30, involved the same principle, it being necessary that before any rights grew out of the violation of the statute, it was necessary for the jury to find from the evidence that such violation proximately contributed to the injuries which were claimed.”
¶9The trial court properly refused to give the affirmative charge with hypothesis.
¶10Assignment No. 1. It is argued that the motion for a new trial should have been granted because the verdict was contrary to the evidence and because it was excessive. The first question is answered by Hamilton v. Browning, 257 Ala. 72, 57 So.2d 530, 536, where the court said:
“It is asserted that the trial court was in error in overruling the motion for a new trial because the verdict of the jury was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Where there is evidence which, if believed, justified the verdict, the motion for a new trial is properly overruled. Johnson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 240 Ala. 219, 198 So. 350; Kurn v. Counts, 247 Ala. 129, 22 So.2d 725. Verdicts are presumed to be correct and no ground of new trial is more carefully scrutinized or more rigidly limited than that the verdict is against the evidence. Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738. It is recognized by this court that when the presiding judge refuses, as here, to grant a new trial, the presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict is strengthened. Bell v. Nichols, 245 Ala. 274, 16 So.2d 799; Southern R. Co. v. Kirsch, 150 Ala. 659, 43 So. 796; Smith v. Smith, 254 Ala. 404, 48 So.2d 546. See W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. McKenzie, [256 Ala. 496] 55 So.2d 919. After allowing all reasonable presumptions in favor of the correctness of the verdict, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the court that it is wrong and unjust. Cobb v. Malone, supra.”
¶11Some of the rules applying to the amount of the verdict are contained in Montgomery City Lines v. Davis, 261 Ala. 491, 74 So.2d 923, 925, where the court, speaking through Justice Clayton said:
“The rule has often been stated in this court that a jury’s award of damages cannot be disturbed unless so excessive or so grossly inadequate as to indicate passion, prejudice, corruption or mistake. It is also the rule that damages which may be awarded for pain and mental anguish are in large measure discretionary and unless the amount awarded is so excessive or inadequate as to indicate prejudice or *420passion, they will not be reversed. 2 Alabama Digest, Appeal and Error, <®=>1004(1), cites many cases supportive of this statement.
… *
“Reviewing court will substitute its judgment for that of the jury and trial court on the question of damages only if the amount is so excessive or so grossly inadequate as to be indicative of prejudice, passion, partiality or corruption on the part of the jury. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Baum [249 Ala. 442, 31 So.2d 366], supra; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Lawson, 239 Ala. 236, 194 So. 659; Cobb v. Malone, supra; Sorrell v. Lindsey, 247 Ala. 630, 25 So.2d 725.”
¶12We do not think the amount of the verdict, $15,000, was excessive under the principles stated supra.
¶13Having treated all the argued assignments of error, the application for rehearing is granted and the judgment of the lower court should be and is affirmed.
¶14Application for rehearing granted.
¶15Affirmed.