¶1Bankbuptcy <@=>189 — Chattel moktgage without change of possession INVALID AS TO TKUSTEE.
¶2Whore the real purpose of a transaction, in form an absolute transfer by a drug company of a soda fountain with a lease back, was to give the lessor security for her alleged loan, on property which the debtor drug company still held in possession and never delivered, the lessor had no lights in the property as against the drug company's trustee in bankruptcy, under Bankruptcy Act, § 47a (2), Comp. St. § 9631.
¶3Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Charles P. Orr, Judge.
¶4Petition by Anna J. Burnett for proceeds of sale of property, opposed by Elliott Frederick, trustee in bankruptcy of the Arcade Drug-Company. From an order denying the petition, petitioner appeals.
¶5Affirmed.
¶6*682W. W. Stoner, Lowrie C. Barton, J. M. Stoner & Sons, and L. M. Alpern, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
¶7Morris, Walker & Boyle and Abraham Seder, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
¶8Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and HAIGHT, Circuit Judges.
¶10In the store of the Arcade Drug Company, a bankrupt corporation of Pennsylvania, Frederick, as trustee, found a soda water fountain and other .fixtures, which were subsequently claimed by Mrs. Anna J. Burnett. By agreement between her and the trustee, these claimed articles were sold by him without prejudice to her right to claim the proceeds. Accordingly, she later petitioned the court to direct payment to be made to her of the money realized from such sale. To this the trustee answered, denying her right thereto. The matter was sent to the referee, who took testimony, made the findings printed in the margin,1 and denied Mrs. *683Burnett’s petition for payment to her of the proceeds of the sale of the fixtures, in that regard holding: .
“The question, therefore, is whether, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the title to the fixtures passed to the. petitioner as against, the trustee clothed with the rights conferred upon him by section 47a (2) above quoted. While tile title papers on their face show absolute transfer by the Drug Company to the petitioner, and lease by the petitioner to the Drug Company, the referee is compelled to the conclusion that the real transaction, although in the form of an absolute transfer, and then a lease back, was in reality simply an attempt to secure the petitioner for her loans by paper title without change of possession (assuming that it was in a sense her money that went through the Drug Company to Green & Son), and this the law does not permit. Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & 11. 275, 9 Am. Dec. 348; Barlow v. Fox, 203 I’a. 114, 52 Atl. 57.”
¶11On certificate to the court below, it approved the action of the referee, whereupon this appeal was taken.
¶12Its study of the proofs satisfies this court that the referee properly held that the real transaction, although in form an absolute transfer *684with a lease back, was not such in fact, but that the actual purpose and the real transaction was to give Mrs. Burnett security for her alleged loan, on property which the debtor still held in possession and never delivered. After the transaction, the possession remained just as it did before, nor was any notice of the transaction given in any way to any one.
¶13Under these facts, the referee committed no error in denying Mrs. Burnett’s petition. When the bankruptcy occurred, the bankrupt company was indebted (although the time for the payment of their claims had previously been extended to a date subsequent to the filing of the petition for adjudication) in a considerable amount to creditors whose debts antedated the Burnett transfer and lease. If one of these creditors had eventually secured judgment against the Drug Company, and had issued an execution thereon, and levied on these fixtures, and if Mrs. Burnett had given'notice of the unrecorded and unnoted lien which the referee had found the facts of the case alone amounted to, would the execution of the Drug Company’s creditor or this attempted lien of Mrs. Burnett’s have prevailed ? Under such facts, the attempted secret lien must yield, under the laws of Pennsylvania, to the superi- or right of the creditor’s execution levied on the goods in the open, unchanged, and credit-inviting possession of the debtor. Such being the superior right of an execution creditor of the Drug Company to this property, when the bankruptcy occurred, sections 47a and 70e of the Bankrupt Law (Comp. St. §§ 9631, 9654) vested the right of the execution creditor in Frederick, the trustee.
¶14The order of the court below is therefore affirmed.