De Souza v. Barber’s Empirical Analysis
263 F.2d 470 · 1959
Citation profile
22 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently August 2004 · most notably 67 Cal. 2d 365 - People v. Lara (1967), Jie Lin v. Ashcroft (2004)
22 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Bridges v. Wixon · United States Bilokumsky v. Tod · White v. Miller · Arthur C. Amos v. The Pullman Company · Commonwealth v. Preece
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A statutory definition of minority, without more, does not in itself render inadmissible confessions or admissions of an infant. Whether the confession or admission is competent depends not alone upon the infant’s age, but also upon his intelligence, education, information, understanding, and ability to comprehend.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Whether the confession or admission is competent depends not alone upon the infant’s age, but also upon his intelligence, education, information, understanding and ability to comprehend, (citations omitted). The same factors should be considered in determining whether an infant is competent to waive counsel. In Williams v. Huff, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 31 , 142 F.2d 91 , 94 (1944), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had under consideration habeas corpus proceedings where a seventeen year old boy had waived his right to counsel in a criminal case. While the author of the opinion would have held as a matter of law that a boy of seventeen cannot competently waive his right to counsel in a criminal case, the majority of the court took the position that the ‘appellant’s competence was a question of fact, in the determination of which his youth was entitled to serious consideration but was not necessarily conclusive’, and that the ‘District Court should take evidence and determine whether, in the light of his age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts, he has sustained the burden of proving that his waiver was not competent and intelligent’. See also Curtis v. Hiatt, 161 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1947); Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 236 F.2d 666 (1956); McBride v. Jacobs, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 189 , 247 F.2d 595 (1957), cf. Dooling v. Overholser, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 247 , 243 F.2d 825 (1957). DeSouza v. Barber, 263 F.2d at 476-477 . 16”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.