Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 263 F.3d 178 - Loliscio v. Goord

Loliscio v. Goord’s Empirical Analysis

263 F.3d 178 · 2001

Citation profile

85
cited by 85 later decisions
2
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

39 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Chapman v. State of California · Williams v. Taylor · Brecht v. Abrahamson · McMann v. Richardson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Feder al law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We find . . . that trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, and thus that the state court's determination to the contrary constituted an unreasonable application of the first prong of Strickland. "). 153 We conclude as well that the N.Y. Court of Appeals's decision that Henry had not made a sufficient showing of prejudice resulting from counsel's presentation of the false alibi defense constituted an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland 's test for prejudice. The Henry II Court's view that "counsel's presentation of the alibi testimony did not diminish the legitimacy of defendant's misidentification defense,”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.