Magley v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

197 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 198 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Counsel is presumed to have prepared and executed his client’s defense effectively. State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610 , 291 N.E.2d 70 ; Bobbins v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 273 , 274 N.E.2d 255 . This presumption is rationally grounded in the educational and other requirements for admission to the practice of law, but is rebuttable by strong and convincing proof. Robbins v. State, supra. In resolving the issue, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding counsel’s pre-trial preparation and the actual conduct of the trial. Lowe v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 610 , 298 N.E.2d 421 ; Blackburn v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 5 , 291 N.E.2d 686 ; Sargeant v. State (1973), 157 Ind.App. 173 , 299 N.E.2d 219 . Perfunctory representation is not enough. Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63 , 51 N.E.2d 848 ; Castro v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 385 , 147 N.E. 321 . Counsel must have reasonable time for pre-trial preparation. Hartman v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 199 , 292 N.E.2d 293 . Deliberate choices made by counsel for some contemplated tactical or strategic reason which turn out to be detrimental to the client’s cause do not establish ineffective representation. Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U.S. 443 , 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 ; Lowe v. State, supra.” Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811, 814 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Adams v. State · Holt v. State

2. “"As a backdrop to proper consideration of this matter, it should be kept in mind that, in these situations, the State has already successfully met the issues raised in the challenge and shown beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the waiver and statement. When a simple objection for the purpose of preserving appellate rights is made, the trial judge should consider the pretrial determination res judicata.[ 3 ] and binding upon him and overrule the objection. If, however, the trial objection is based upon new factual or legal matter, a simple overruling of the objection would not be appropriate. In that instance, the trial judge may expect, and indeed require, that he be provided with an accurate summary description of such new matter. Thereafter, either of two levels of judicial response is appropriate. The trial judge may summarily overrule the objection if the new matter could in no event result in a determination of inadmissibility. This summary «disposition may be made upon consideration of counsel's description, or, in the discretion of the judge, after having permitted the defense to call witnesses, to present its new matter. On the other hand, if the trial judge deems such new matter to be of sufficient substance, he may conduct a hearing on the motion to suppress [sic], having a scope appropriate under the cireumstances, and reconsider the issue of admissibility. Gasaway v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 241 , 231 N.E.2d 513 . In Rouse v. U.S., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 348 ,”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Joyner v. State · Elizabeth J. Strickland v. State of Indiana

3. “[I]n considering whether the State has met its burden, `We will consider the evidence which supports the decision of the trier of fact in the case of contested evidence, and any uncontested evidence presented by the appellant.'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. State · Harrison v. State