Winston v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““I concur in the result reached by the majority. Í would not however, retreat from our pronouncement in Martin v. State (1972), [258] Ind. [83], 279 N.E.2d 189 , that a post-arrest lineup is a ‘critical stage’ requiring the presence of counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Constitution.of Indiana. Recognizing Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 as disposing of this issue con-trawise under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, nevertheless, that determination is not dispositive of the same issue as viewed by this Court under our state constitution, inasmuch as our determination in no way violates-the. federal constitution but merely gives a more expansive right to counsel. The rule in Martin is clear and workable and need be no great burden to the state. ' . ' “In the casé at bar, the identification "by Miss Rogers occurred so close in point of time-to the robbery that it did not constitute a critical stage requiring the presence of an attorney. As set out in Martin (supra) this Court has held ‘[T]his Court has held that an on-the-scene confrontation between a witness and a suspect conducted within a reasonably short time after the commission of the crime for the purpose of determining whether the witness can identify the suspect is not within the scope of the Wade-Gilbert rule. . . .’ Dillard v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 282 , 274 N.E.2d 389 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Ind. App. 543 - Griffin v. State

2. ““We believe the Stovall test focuses attention on two different sets of facts: (1) The facts bearing on whether the confrontation was conducted in such a fashion as to lead the witness to make a mistaken identification. . . . (2) The facts bearing on how good a chance the witness had to observe the perpetrator of the crime such that any suggestiveness in the conduct of the confrontation could be resisted by the witness and he could make an accurate decision as to whether the man presented was the man who committed the crime. These would include the length of time the witness was in the presence of the perpetrator, the distance of the witness from him, the lighting conditions at the time, capacity for observation by the witness, opportunity to observe particular characteristics of the criminal, etc.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Ind. App. 543 - Griffin v. State

3. ““The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 ; Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 , 22 L.Ed.2d 402 . When a person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense, Stovall strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Ind. App. 543 - Griffin v. State