¶1(dissenting).
¶2I must dissent from the majority because I find merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the overruling of the motion to suppress the two air conditioners found in the back of the U-Haul-It truck. The majority finds that the officers had probable cause to believe that stolen air conditioners were in the truck and, therefore, were entitled to search for them. Armed with this conclusion the majority finds it unnecessary to meet the issues of when the arrests *184occurred and whether the officers had authority to make the arrests outside their jurisdiction.
¶3• The fallacy of this conclusion is that probable cause was acquired too late under the factual sequence to authorize the search and seizure. The first officer on the scene, while attempting to act in his official capacity and on less than suspicion, detained the truck outside his jurisdiction, questioned the occupants, and peered into the back portion of the truck. Only then was there probable cause for the search. Lacking jurisdiction for the detention and incidental scrutiny of the truck which established probable cause, he could neither arrest nor seize.
¶4While patrolling in the early morning hours, Officer Robertson had received a radio alert to be on the lookout for a U-Haul-It truck since a report had been received of a prowler leaving a subdivision in such a truck. Shortly thereafter on the edge of the city limits Robertson saw such a truck and turned in behind and followed it. He called the officers who were still investigating in the subdivision and confirmed- the type of truck. After travelling about one quarter of a mile out of the city limits, the truck pulled into a gas station and stopped near a pump. Robertson notified headquarters that he was going to question the occupants, and a back-up patrol car was dispatched to the station to render assistance if necessary. He then detained the-truck and the occupants and secured from-the driver his driver’s license. On questioning the occupants, Robertson learned that they were hauling air conditioners. which they said had been purchased about, midnight, but they could not produce any-proof of ownership. Peering in the back of the truck Robertson saw the air conditioners with sawed-off copper tubing. Ordinarily the air conditioners would have: been separated from the copper tubing connections by simply unscrewing the connection. The back-up patrol car arrived, and after giving the two officers the information he had learned, Robertson radioed the. police in the subdivision to check vacant-houses in the area for missing air conditioners. He then called his superior and" asked him to come to the scene. Sergeant. Whitney arrived, and shortly afterwards a second sergeant arrived but remained only-a brief time. It was decided that the occupants of the truck should be allowed to-leave, but first Robertson asked their permission to copy the serial numbers on the-air conditioners. As he completed copying-the serial numbers, he received a radio-message that there were three air conditioners missing in the subdivision and that: the copper tubing had been sawed in two.. The occupants were then taken to the police: station for questioning after having been: detained approximately an hour at the gas-station.
¶5*186Under these circumstances it cannot he said that Robertson had knowledge that a felony had been committed or that he had reasonable cause to believe that an offense had been committed. (Art. 213(2) and (3), C.Cr.P.) He was not in pursuit to arrest when he followed the truck out of his jurisdiction. (Cf. Art. 231, C.Cr.P., and 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson’s ed. 1957) § 1592, where enforcement officials from one state are recognized to have authority to pursue persons reasonably believed to have committed a felony into another state. See also, Art. 213, C.Cr.P., as amended by Act 646 of 1972 to expressly grant this right of pursuit to officials from one jurisdiction to another within this state.) Thus there was no legal arrest and no basis for probable cause for the search in connection with an arrest. Whitely v. Warden of Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1971).
¶6' A police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, stop and detain a person to investigate possible criminal behavior even though he does not have probable cause for an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed. 2d 612 (1972). Here, however, when Robertson left his jurisdictional territory, he lost his authority to act in his capacity as a policeman. Even if we were to hold that he could still act as a private citizen (4 Wharton, supra, § 1614), the authority granted to private citizens is restricted to arrests based upon probable cause (Art. 214, C.Cr.P., and 4 Wharton, supra, § 1614). So Robertson could not detain the occupants of the truck at the gas station.
¶7Moreover, it would be unwise to let a police officer escape his obligations as a policeman and the apparent authority with which his uniform clothes him by allowing him to act in the role of private citizen. The relationships of a citizen to a citizen and a citizen to a policeman have too great a disparity to expect the same results from a confrontation between a citizen and a citizen and a confrontation between a citizen and a policeman. For example, few if any of us would let an ordinary citizen have our driver’s license, detain our motor vehicle, and inspect its interior. Yet here, because of the uniforms, unauthorized policemen who had no greater authority than any citizen were able to accomplish these things.
¶8Furthermore, a lengthy delay occurred while the police gathered information on the possible commission of a crime by the occupants of the truck, but no attempt was made to notify the proper officers with authority in that jurisdiction. When Robertson called in to check the type of truck described in the radio alert or when he called in to say that the occupants had stopped at the gas station, he should have asked *188for assistance from the prope'r authorities with jurisdiction in that area, and maintained. surveillance of the truck until they arrived.
¶9Since there was no legal arrest, there ■could be no warrantless search pursuant to arrest, and that which was seized should liave been suppressed.
¶10Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved when defendant was denied access to physical evidence including handprints and fingerprints, which he sought in order that he •might have experts of his ■ own choosing examine it in preparation for testifying. 'The majority does not even meet the issue raised by this bill as presented and argued 'by both the defense and the State. I am of the opinion that State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682, permits examination of physical evidence under orders and guidance of the court for protection and •preservation of that evidence. There is no reason why Migliore should be restricted to narcotics. Examination of physical evidence is not discovery. Handwriting, ballistics, and fingerprint experts differ as do most expert witnesses, and the only means by which the defendant can defend against expert testimony by the State is to offer expert testimony of his own. I am of the opinion that Bill No. 2 is good insofar as it addresses itself to denial of access to the ■defendant for examination of physical evidence.
¶11respectfully dissent.