Crosse v. Callis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Broker seeks to hold defendant under the statute by claiming that defendant was acting for an undisclosed principal and, therefore, under the holdings in Hospelhorn v. Poe, 174 Md. 242, 257 , 198 A. 582 (1938), and Codd Company v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, 325 , 55 A. 623 (1903), that defendant is responsible for the commissions. The real situation here seems to be that defendant was acting for partially disclosed principals, the individuals who ultimately formed The Eastern Shore Development Corp. The difference between the terms ‘undisclosed principal’ and ‘partially disclosed principal’ becomes readily apparent when one examines Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4 (1958), which states in part: “(2) If the other party has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a principal but has no notice of the principal’s identity, the principal for whom the agent is acting is a partially disclosed principal. (3) If the other party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principal, the one for whom he acts is an undisclosed principal.” Illustration 6 gives the example: “A offers to sell a horse to T, and in reply to T’s question concerning the identity of the owner for whom he is acting, A states that he is unable to give his name. The principal is partially disclosed.” See also 2 Williston on Contracts §§ 283 and 285 (3rd ed. Jaeger 1959); Wheaton Lumber Co. v. Metz, 229 Md. 78, 83 , 181 A.2d 666 (1962); and 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 307 (1962). Whether one speaks of an agent for an und”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 527 - Hill v. County Concrete Co., Inc.

2. “3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 317 (1962); Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Tex. 527 , 44 S.W. 819 , 43 L.R.A. 593 (1898); Potter v. Chaney, 290 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.1956), and 1 Mechem on Agency § 1414 (2nd ed. 1914). In the latter work it is said: The liability is to be determined by the conditions known at the time the contract was made or other transaction had. If at that time the principal was not disclosed, his subsequent disclosure -will not relieve the agent. A disclosure, however, is sufficient within this rule if, though not made at the time negotiations were begun, it is full and complete before any contract is made or obligation incurred. And, though not made until after one contract has been entered into, the disclosure would be operative as to further contracts if fully made before such new contracts are consummated. As has already been pointed out, a usage that the agent shall be personally liable if he does not disclose his principal within a reasonable time, even though the agent would not by reason of its terms be primarily liable upon the contract, is good.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 527 - Hill v. County Concrete Co., Inc.

3. ““ ‘In a leading American case it is said that “the word ‘promoter’ has no precise and inflexible meaning in this country,” which seems to be true in England as well; but it is also said that “in a comprehensive sense ‘promoter’ includes those who undertake to form a corporation and to procure for it the rights, instrumentalities and capital by which it is to carry out the purposes set forth in its charter, and to establish it as fully able to do its business.” ’ ” 263 Md. at 72 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McDaniel v. Service Feed & Supply, Inc.