Davis v. Wolfe’s Empirical Analysis
263 U.S. 239 · 1923
Citation profile
83 federal appellate · 78 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 208 later decisions (32 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2011 · most notably Urie v. Thompson (1949), Kernan v. American Dredging Co. (1958)
83 federal appellate · 78 state decisions — followed in 19 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Southern Railway Company v. United States · Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Layton · Minneapolis St Louis Railroad Company v. Nora Gotschall E · St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad v. Conarty
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 208 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The rule clearly deducible from these four cases is that, on the one hand, an employee cannot recover under the Safety Appliance Act if the failure to comply with its requirements is not a proximate cause of the accident whieh results in his injury, but merely creates an incidental condition or situation in which the accident, otherwise caused, results in such injury; and, on the other hand, he can recover if the failure to comply with the requirements of the Act is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection.””
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““While it is undoubtedly true that the immediate occasion for passing the laws requiring automatic couplers was the great number of deaths and injuries caused to employees who were obliged to go between cars to couple and uncouple them, yet these laws as written are by no means confined in their terms to the protection of employees only when so engaged. The language of the acts and the authorities we have cited made entirely clear that the liability in damages to employees for failure to comply with the lav/ springs from its being made unlawful to use cars not equipped as required — not from the position the employee may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured. This effect can be given to the acts and their wise and humane purpose can be accomplished only by holding, as we do, that carriers are liable to employees in damages whenever the failure to obey these safety appliance laws is the proximate cause of injury to them when engaged in the discharge of duty.””
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““While there is no previous decision of this court relating to this aspect of section 4, a controlling analogy is to be found in its decisions as to the application of section 2 of the act, which, as amended, makes it unlawful to use on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce any ear not equipped with automatic couplers capable of being coupled and uncoupled 'without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars/ * * * if the failure to comply with the requirements of the act is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection. * * * It results that in the present case, as there was substantial evidence tending to show that the defective condition of the grabiron required by section 4 of the Safety Appliance Act was a proximate cause of the accident resulting in injury to Wolfe while in the discharge of his duty as a conductor, the ease was properly submitted to the jury under the act; and, the issues having been determined by the jury in his favor, the judgment of the trial court was in that behalf properly affirmed.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.