Nara v. Frank’s Empirical Analysis
264 F.3d 310 · 2001
Citation profile
42 federal appellate · 8 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 110 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2021 · most notably Holland v. Florida (2010), Holland v. Florida (2010)
42 federal appellate · 8 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Christopher Artuz Superintendent Green Haven Correctional Facility v. Tony Bruce Bennett · City of Los Angeles v. Department of Transportation · Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central District of California · Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections · Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Commission
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 110 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. (2) The time during which a properly-filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The PCRA trial court accepted the motion, allowed the parties to brief the motion, and made a full consideration of the record before denying it. Indeed, Nara notes that his motion merely followed what the Superior Court suggested when the court disposed of Nara’s second PCRA petition. Lastly, Nara contends that it is not uncommon for Pennsylvania courts to accept motions to withdraw guilt pleas nunc pro tunc. Thus, we hold that Nara’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea nunc pro tunc was a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of 2244(d)(2).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“akin to an application for state post-conviction or other collateral review.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.