Medlock v. State

¶1dissenting.

[W]hen cross-examining a defendant’s character witnesses,] [a] district attorney must be able to show that the questions posed to the defendant’s character witness [es] were asked in good faith and based on reliable information that can be supported by admissible evidence.

¶2State v. Clark, 258 Ga. 464 (369 SE2d 900) (1988). See also Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246 (2) (430 SE2d 754) (1993), where we emphasized the mandatory nature of the district attorney’s duty, and Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80 (8) (c) (402 SE2d 41) (1991). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the district attorney’s cross-examination was based on reliable evidence that could be supported by admissible evidence.3 In light of circumstances present in this case, however, I must disagree with the majority’s implicit determination that the State established that the district attorney’s cross-examination of the character witnesses was conducted in good faith.

¶3Good faith is “[h]onesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.” Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.). It is “that state of mind denot*700ing honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.). At the trial of the case at bar, the district attorney was well aware of his obligation to demonstrate his good faith and the reliable information on which he based his cross-examination because he had been the district attorney involved in “the clear and unambiguous holding in Christenson [v. State, 261 Ga. 80].” Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. at 247. Despite this knowledge, he did not do so, made no attempt to do so, and “maintained that he was not required to make any sort of showing.” Id. On appeal, this court la-belled as “specious” and “without merit” the State’s attempt to distinguish the holding in Christensonfrom the case at bar, and the State’s suggestion that this particular issue was unsettled law. Id. at 247, n. 2. Thus, the district attorney displayed a lack of good faith as he was not free “from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.), supra.

¶4Prior to the trial of the case at bar, the district attorney knew that appellant intended to present character witnesses and therefore had time to research appellant’s prior bad acts in preparation for cross-examination of the character witnesses. Nevertheless, he failed to set forth the reliable information on which he based his cross-examination when counsel for appellant objected. I can only conclude that the district attorney displayed a lack of faithfulness to his duty and obligation to produce the required basis for his cross-examination and, in failing to do so, did not live up to his obligation to ensure that the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence and the laws of Georgia. McAlister v. State, 204 Ga. App. 259 (1) (419 SE2d 64) (1992).

“It has often been stated that it is the duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that justice is done and nothing more. That duty should not be forgotten in an excess of zeal or the eager quest for victory.” [Cit.]

¶5Rodriguez v. State, 184 Ga. App. 819, 820 (363 SE2d 23) (1987).

¶6Because I am of the opinion that the State failed to establish that the district attorney acted in good faith when he cross-examined appellant’s character witnesses, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment on remand.