dissent">

Dissenting Opinion

DeBruler, J.

The informant who bought the drugs from appellant appeared and testified at trial. He testified that he and his police handlers were driving around in the early morning hours. The police, together with the informant, decided to investigate things at the tavern, because it was reputed to be a place where drugs might be available. The police and the informant did not expect to find appellant there. *416In fact, appellant was not known to the officers at all. The informant, on the other hand, knew that appellant was dealing in drugs. The informant gave the facts from which we must determine whether the State carried its burden of showing probable cause to solicit appellant. He testified:

“Q. How well do you know the Defendant in this case, Bobby Thomas ?

A. Not too well but I know him.

Q. When did you first meet him?

A. When I was dealing drugs.

Q. When you went into the In Crowd about 1:15 in the morning.

A. I think it was somewhere around there.

Q. Approximately how many people were in there on this particular night?

A. I don’t know. I didn’t pay any attention.

Q. You didn’t pay no attention. You just walked in—

A. And after recognizing—

Q. And you said ‘who’s in order’.

A. No. After recognizing him I immediately went up—

Q. Oh, you went up to him. You didn’t recognize anyone else.

A. I knew he was dealing in drugs and I knew he would know where some was.

Q. Did you know he was going to be there that night?

A. No I didn’t.

Q. What was your purpose in going to the In Crowd?

A. To see if there was anybody in there dealing.

Q. What did he say to you ?

A. He said he had it.

$ $ $

Q. And you went in and saw Thomas and said ‘who is in order’ Now how loud did you say this?

A. Well when you are buying drugs you don’t broadcast it.

Q. Well that is what I am asking you, you know, just give us an idea.

A. Just very softly.”

*417This testimony would support the conclusion that the informer had a semblance of probable cause to believe that appellant was dealing in drugs, and that he directly solicited appellant to sell him some drugs. Appellant agreed and the sale of a single packet of heroin was made to the informant for $10.00.

It is appellant’s claim on appeal, that the evidence of probable cause was insufficient, since that probable cause shown existed only in the mind of the informant and had not been communicated to the police prior to the solicitation. Appellant cites no cases to support his contention. The State argues that the officers had constructive knowledge of facts constituting probable cause, relying upon a general rule applied in civil cases that knowledge of an agent is knowledge of the principal, but citing no entrapment cases on point. In Smith v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 415, 281 N.E.2d 803; Walker v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641; and Heath v. U.S., (10th Cir. 1948) 169 F.2d 1007, it was contemplated that the “officers” or the “state” would have probable cause to suspect the target of the entrapment scheme. They do not reach this issue.

The purpose of requiring the State to establish probable cause to initiate a trap is to deter the police authorities from soliciting persons to commit crimes whom the police have no reasonable grounds to believe are engaged in unlawful activity.

In my view, the deterrent effect of this rule upon the conduct of an informant is practically nil, and therefore I would require that knowledge of facts constituting probable cause be proved to have been known by actual police officers prior to the initiation of any trap by an informant. In the first place, an officer is trained in the law and is sworn to uphold it. He, therefore, has the legal training to discern when reasonable grounds exist. The ordinary informant has no such education and is not likely to be restrained by any allegiance to the supremacy of law. More importantly, the career of an informant does not continue on after a judicial determination of no probable cause has been made in the prosecution of some case in which he has unlawfully initiated *418an entrapment scheme. Officer Sims demonstrated this in his testimony explaining the three month delay in arresting appellant for this sale. He testified:

“Q. Would you tell the court then why you did not arrest this particular subject upon the scene of this alleged crime ?

A. Well for the simple reason that when we was making these buys, if we had arrested him then we would have blew our whole thing, our whole investigation and informants are too hard to find. We could never have used this man again to make any more buys. We used this man to make approximately 15 or 20 more buys after this buy, you see, and we had about 15 or 20 buys before this buy.

Q. Didn’t you expect to ever go to court on this. You knew you had to bring him into court?

A. Sure, sure.

Q. So what were you really blowing ?

A. Well, when we came to court, like we are in court now, we no longer use him as an informant. We can’t because everybody knows him.”

This shows that an informant has no interest in maintaining his employment over an extended period. He gets no promotions and no pension. He knows that after his first trial, the interest of the police in using him as an informer is over, and, therefore, he need only please them in his street duties up to the time of that first trial.

It was also pointed out in testimony that while informants have no quotas to meet in making such buys, they are under pressure from the police to produce, and, if they do not, their salaries are cut off. It is highly unlikely that informants, some of whom are addicts and former dealers themselves, as is the informant in this case, and who rely upon their police pay to sustain their own habits, will use caution in determining whether what they may know about a particular person standing on a street corner, constitutes probable cause.

Note. — Reported at 345 N.E.2d 835.

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