Lamb v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On voir dire examination the prosecutor read each prospective juror the following statement: “The rule of law which throws around the defendant the presumption of innocence and requires the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, every material fact averred in the indictment is not intended to shield those who are actually guilty from just and merited punishment but it is a humane provision of the law which is intended for the protection of the innocent, and to guard, so far as human agencies can, against the conviction of those unjustly accused of crime.” At the time the statement was read appellant objected on the ground that it was an improper statement of the law. As an instruction the statement was approved in Anderson v. State, (1885) 104 Ind. 467 , 4 N.E. 63 . Appellant now argues that the statement was prejudicial in that it tended to dilute the presumption of innocence by asking prospective jurors to ignore it. We believe a better place for this particular statement would have been in an instruction and not in voir dire. We find that an instruction similar to the above statement was given to the jurors without objection by appellant. Nevertheless, the purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a prospective juror is able to deliberate fairly on the issue of guilt. In this connection, the statement merely explains that the presumption of innocence is not irrebuttable in fact, if the state presents evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that appellant’s in”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lamb v. Duckworth

2. “Procedurally, appellant challenged the admissibility of his confession through a pre-trial motion to suppress. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, at which appellant did not testify, the trial court overruled the motion. At trial when the confessions were introduced, appellant did not raise any objection other than to rely upon his earlier motion. The overruling of such motion was assigned as error in appellant’s motion to correct errors, and it is that error which we review below. In so doing, we review the evidence before the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress together with all evidence presented prior to the admission of the confessions. Appellant maintains that statements he made to the police on September 2nd and 6th, 1973, were not voluntarily given and should have been suppressed. When the statements were given, appellant had been in jail for several months on another charge. Commencing in July, 1973, John Lasiter and Sheriff John Means, both of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department, began questioning appellant about the murder here charged. The frequency of these sessions was no more than twice a week, and the duration of each session ranged from half an hour to forty-five minutes. Appellant’s Miranda rights were explained to him before each of these inquiries. These sessions were discontinued sometime during the latter part of August, apparently because they were unproductive. Sheriff Means testified at the motion to suppress hearing that i”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lamb v. Duckworth